

A Comprehensive Analysis of R. I. Bruce Maliki System: A Case Study of Mahsud Tribe 1888-1896

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Abstract

This article discusses in detail the role of Maliks in Mahsud Tribal society. The different hurdles which this Maliki system faced and which undermined the effectiveness and activities of this system. This article also discusses in detail, that in spite of its timely failure for the British to control the Mahsud Tribe and ruled them indirectly, the Maliki system still exists in Tribal areas and the local Mahsud consider it a good system. Further this article discusses in detail different factors which were responsible for its partial failure during the British period. Every Tribal society has its norms and values the combination of which forms its Culture. The Mahsud Tribe of Waziristan living on Pakistan-Afghanistan border area has a unique culture and history. They are the only tribe which never subjugated to any foreign rule or governmental authority nor did they allow any foreign invader to enter their land. Their independent nature, distinct culture and love of warfare make it very hard for the British government to control them permanently after the successful application of Robert Sandeman Maliki System in Baluchistan, Deputy Commissioner D.I.Khan Waziristan, R.I. Bruce introduced this model on Mahsud and other tribes of Waziristan, but he failed to get the desired results. There are multiple reasons and factors which were responsible for its unpopularity. The present paper will analyze the different factors, like the complexity of religion and Culture in Mahsud society, the role of the Afghan Amir's, and mainly the British government's state of unawareness of local culture and system and the clash of their empirical values with the local customs. Further, the results of this study will help the Pakistan government to improve their relations with the tribe.

Keywords: Mahsud Tribe, Culture, Maliki System, Resistance

Introduction

The Mahsud and Wazir tribes of Waziristan both descended from the same ancestral links and due to this fact for a long time they were known as one tribe. The two tribes were

described as ‘Panthers’ and ‘Wolves’ respectively by Olaf Caroe, the last British governor of the NWFP (North-West Frontier Province), now Khyber Pukhtunkhwa, Province (Ahmed, 2004). However, for all practical purposes the Mahsud are separate tribes. They are living in the former South Waziristan agency now the District of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa. Their main centre is Kaniguram and Makin, where they live in a cluster of villages under the Preghal Mountain (Caroe, 1957). Although not a political or administrative authority, and with no well-defined boundaries, the region remains a free land of naturally Independent tribes (Wylly, 1912). The Mahsud tribe throughout history held a reputation as the most united and warrior tribe of the region (Sammon, 2008). The failed attempt of the British government for the direct rule compelled them to introduce a new system to rule the Mahsud and other tribes indirectly through Middleman. For that purpose they introduced Sandeman system (Malik, 2013). Before the British occupation, Malik or leader of the Clan, Tribal leader was the White beards aged man, who were respected by their Tribal segment because of their links in genealogical chains, (Khan et al., 2015). Historically, Pukhtoon society was controlled by hereditary chiefs (Maliks) along with a traditional code of honour. These un-written codes remain the essential character of Pukhtoon society. (Bangash, 1996). In mid-1860’s Major S. F. Graham, Deputy Commissioner of D.I. Khan District (1862-66), devised a scheme to settle some Mahsud in British territory, and he also gave them services in Frontier Militia, but the raids of the Mahsud continued, and the relations further deteriorated when government decided to built military posts in their area. Then after that Captain Charles Macaulay, Deputy Commissioner D.I.Khan District (1871-82), replaced the Nawab of Tank and took the responsibility of relations with Mahsud tribe in his hand. Macaulay used Nabi Khan Shingi and Azim Khan Kundi as the new middleman to conduct relations with the Mahsud. However, these new arrangements also failed because of the Nawab party, who committed raids, kidnapping and murders in British territory and hence, the situation remained the same (Williams, 2005). Richard Bruce, Deputy Commissioner (1888-90) and then Commissioner Derajat Division (1890-96), before coming to D.I. Khan as deputy commissioner remained under the services of Sir Robert Sandeman, the government agent for Baluchistan (1877-1892).

Sandeman successfully subdued the tribes of Baluchistan with a policy of “Friendly penetration and occupation”. Bruce, want to apply the model of his previous boss on Mahsud tribe, and for that purpose, he quickly started his work. The results of his policies never brought the desired results and how can it be successful? The main factor and essential component of Sandeman policy was concentration of troops, building new forts, capturing strategic locations, construction of roads and free hand in expenditure but due to the different nature and sensitivity of the region and because of the Great game between Russia and Britain for Bruce all these were not permitted freely. He worked there with limited resources, and no penetrations of troops were allowed in the start. The Maliks, which he selected within the Mahsud tribe never got support from the British government and therefore never performed up to the desired expectation (Howell, 1979). The difference of Mahsud society and tribal culture from that of Baloch tribal Culture was another big reason. Bruce, methodology to choose his Maliks among the tribe was another factor which added to the failure of his scheme. At was the democratic nature of Mahsud society which never gave due respect to the British selected Maliks and thus helped in the creation of rival force in the shape of religious leadership. Those religious leaders never allowed Maliks to work freely and they always created problems for the British government (Khan, 2014). The System of Maliks, introduced by Bruce was cancelled by Mr. Merk, his successor after him. The problem to control the Mahsud tribe remained the same, and the British government changed its policies from one extreme to another (Howell, 1979).

Significance of the Study

The Mahsud tribe is the most critical and powerful tribe living in the Pak-Afghan border area. The British introduced Maliki System to control them but failed to get the desired results which had far-reaching impacts on the tribal resistance movement against the British. The significance of the research lies in the fact that through Maliki system the British were able to enter the stronghold of Mahsud tribe, and they established contact with many of their influential men but failed to control them fully. This research highlighted different loopholes in British policies. Further this research highlighted the role of religious leaders who opposed Maliks and the causes of why the tribe supported the religious leadership. This issue has not been taken up for high-level research, and the point of view of the Mahsud tribe has not been taken up.

Research Questions

This paper will seek an answer to the following questions:

- 1) How far was the Mahsud tribe willing to adapt to the Maliki system?
- 2) How far was the British selection of the Maliks on Merit?
- 3) How far religious leaders opposed the Maliks?

Research Objectives

The study seeks to achieve the following objectives:

- 1) To analyze the overall impacts of Maliki System on the Mahsud tribe.
- 2) To analyze the role of Maliks.
- 3) To analyze the roots of their opposition.

Research Methodology

The present research is conducted through established patterns recommended for social sciences. For this purpose, the descriptive and analytical research method is applied. As a researcher working on the Pukhtoon history of the British period, one has to deal with sources mainly written by the people working in the Civil and military departments of that time. This paper highlights the local people's point of view up to some extent. The data for this research is collected from government records, books, articles and interviews of the influential local peoples of the Mahsud tribe.

The Introduction of Richard Bruce Malik System for Mahsud Tribe: In Waziristan, British government with the help of its administrators always devised new schemes to control the warrior tribes, but they faced tough and fierce resistance on every step (Sammon, 2008). When during 1888, Mr. Richard Bruce replaced Mr. Ogilvie as Deputy Commissioner of D.I. Khan, he at once, started his new scheme of settlement on the model of Sandeman System. He consistently contacted the influential men of Mahsud tribe and finally in the summer of 1888 successful in making a new agreement with them (Howell, 1979)

The prominent terms of this settlement were.....

- 1) The tribe will pay a sum of total 1790, for the 20 offences which they committed during 1888, without making hostages from them.
- 2) The tribe gave a surety through Azim Khan Kundi that they will pay a sum of 3500 above mentioned.
- 3) Previously two Marwat offenders who took shelter with Mahsud tribe, they agreed to surrender them to the British government.

In return of this agreement, the hostage's system was cancelled, and the tribe received a sum of 1264 per month for their service and patrolling the border. In order to distribute the amount equally on the three branches of Mahsud tribe, a list of Malik was prepared. This system was named the Sillahdari system, and these Maliks were called Sillahdar which were initially 61 in numbers. The Bahlolzai section received 27 Sillahdars, and the Shaman Khel and Alizai each got 17 Sillahdars. The list of these Sillahdars was testified by the fifty-one

leading Maliks of the Mahsud tribe. The Commissioner stated that for the first time the British government was able into the formation of a representative Jirga (assembly) of the Mahsud tribe (Howell, 1979).

On the recommendation of Richard Bruce in late 1889, Sandeman held a great Jirga (assembly) at Appozai, in the Zhob Valley. He invited all the government elected Maliks of the Mahsud, Wazirs and Shirani tribes to this Jirga. At last, after much consideration, the tribes agreed to take the responsibility of keeping the pass open in return for allowances (Sammon, 2008). According to Sandeman system arranged allowances for the Maliks in return for recruitment in Militia service for the tribes and for that purpose devised schemes to built cantonments for these Militia forces along the routes to the critical passes. The British government announced to cancel the recovery of unpaid fine (65,000) on the Mahsud tribe due to their cooperative behaviour (Howell, 1979). The British government in order to ensure the Gomal route safe announced for the construction of a military post in Mir Ali and the recruitment of local militia force. Apart from that the British government announced 50,000 annual allowances for Mahsud tribe (Mahsud, 2017)

Importance of Appozai Agreement and its effects on Mahsud Tribes: Robert Sandeman, after the verbal agreement ensured to prepare a written agreement between the government and the concerned tribes. For the British government, the above agreement first compared to their previous agreements which they signed with the Mahsud tribes during, 1861, 1873, 1874. The reason is that the agreement was signed by many other tribes along Mahsuds (Wazir, 2016).

The Main Features of the Appozai Agreement:

- 1) This agreement paved the way for the distribution of money among the different tribes of Waziristan in the future.
- 2) For the first time, the Maliks of Ahmedzai Wazir tribe agreed for government allowances.
- 3) The most important effect of this agreement was that for the first time, the post of Maliks was regarded by the tribes as worthy of respect (Wazir, 2016).

Results and Consequences: According to Appozai agreement the Mahsud tribe got $\frac{3}{4}$ of the allowances, and the Wazir Ahmedzai section got only $\frac{1}{4}$. The Waziris share was less and which paved the way for further disturbances in the future. The main reason was that the Ahmedzai Wazir section paid fierce resistance against the British since 1846 and apart from that their leading men, e.g. Gulan Khan, Gul Sher Khan, and Sher Band Khan never came to Appozai and the British never fully trusted the Ahmadzai Wazir section. Another vital factor which later created problems was the distribution of allowances in Ahmedzai Wazir section against the Nikat (hereditary) System. The above mentioned Ahmedzai Wazir section leading men instead of coming to Appozai went to Afghanistan. They requested help from the Afghan Amir against the British. The Amir as a result of the Wazir leading men requests sent Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan to Waziristan as their agent (Wazir, 2016). It was mainly because of Sardar Gul Muhammad Khan active campaign against the British that resulted in the creation of two factions among the Mahsud. The Pro-Afghan and Pro-British and the later factions tried their best to create troubles and disturbance through raids. As a result, the ratio of offences against the government significantly increased in the summer of 1892 (Howell, 1979). Mr. Kelley of the public works department was killed by two Abdurehman Khel Mahsud, who were the signatory of Appozai agreement. A war of the regular cavalry and four other sepoys were murdered near the Gomal pass (Spain, 1963). Three men from Abdullais section were charged for the killing of the Sawar. Mr. Bruce in response to all these offences pressed the local Maliks to handover the five offenders to government. After prolonged negotiations he was able to surrender them through Jirga and convicted them. The two Abdurrahman Khel to seven years and the three Abdullai to five years each. The government consider this a great victory to surrender and convict the offenders through

Maliks, but their success was short term” (Bruce, 1900). The Mahsud under the leadership of Mullah Powindah, a Sultanai Shabi Khel Mahsud, who was the dominant factor in Mahsud politics of that time, retaliated strongly against the five Maliks who were involved in the surrender of the offenders. Three of them were murdered, and two were driven out of Waziristan (Sammon, 2008).

The Durand line agreement of 1893 and British occupation of Wana and Mahsud tribe resistance: The Afghan Amir Abdur Rahman, due to avoid the risk of war with the British empire reluctantly decided to agree and accepted the British boundary mission, led by Sir, Motimer Durand. After prolonged negotiations he agreed to the division of boundary became known as Durand Line. The only purpose of the Durand Line was to establish British “Spheres of Influence, but it was later recognized as the International boundary between Afghanistan and British Empire (Gregorian,1969). The Tribes of Waziristan considers this a dent to their sovereignty and they did not recognize it. They consider themselves free, and the uprising of 1897 was also one of the results of this development” (Bruce, 1900).

The British decided to penetrate and occupied Wana permanently in 1894, because of the rising offences of the Mahsud tribe. Bruce launched an expedition for the occupation of Wana, but Mullah Powindah, the religious leader, resisted his efforts. He sent him a letter and demanded the release of the five Mahsud tribe prisoners, which were in jail since 1892. Bruce refused to his demands, and Mullah Powindah attacked the Wana camp at the night of 3rd November 1894 with the help of 2,000 strong force” (Bruce, 1900). The British suffered heavy losses, 45 were killed and 75 wounded including officers, apart from that the Mahsud and Wazir joint force (Lashkar) carried a large number of rifles and 2600 cash with them, more than one hundred transport animals were also killed in the attack. The tribes' losses were estimated around 350 killed according to British sources (Ahmad, 2017, General staff headquarters, 1921). According to Abdul Halim Asar Afghani during the attack on Wana Camp, 471 Mujahidin, 1763 British troops including 63 officers were killed. However, the statement of Afghani is no doubt, highly exaggerated.

Bruce Re-Organization of the Maliki System, 1895: Mr. Bruce in May 1895 admitted that his previous knowledge of Mahsud tribe has certain flaws which needed to be overcome. For that purpose, he prepared a new list of Maliks and distributed them in five categories, due to their influence over the tribe and their services for the British. Apart from that he also increased the annual allowances of the tribe from 50,000 to 60,000 annually (Howell, 1979).

Research Results

Results and Consequences of the Bruce Maliki System: The Mahsud tribe of Waziristan along with other tribes never allowed the British forces to control them permanently and they continuously created problems for them till 1947, when the British left Indian Sub-continent. The architect of Maliki system, Richard Bruce left the area after his retirement, but there was no change in the situation the frequent raids continued, and there were increased in its occurrence. The situation of Waziristan can be best judged from the famous words of British Viceroy Lord Curzon he said; ‘Not until the military steamroller has passed over the country from end to end, will there be peace’. (Howell,1979). The Famous British Novelist and former military officer, Jhon Masters, wrote about the tribes of Waziristan “Physically the hardest people on earth”. (Masters, 1965) In 1920-21 they crushed almost all the Brigade of British forces, some 400 men including 28 British officers and 15 Indian officers were killed, the number of wounded 1683 and total 2286. (Howell, 1979) In the next decade and after, till the British left in 1947, there were more British troops than the rest of Sub-Continent. (Ahmed, 2004).

An Analysis of Bruce Methodology for the selection of Maliks: Bruce selection of Maliks in the Mahsud tribe remained the main factor which added to his failure. He, during his

tenure, mostly choose the wrong men in the wrong place. According to a local Mahsud author, who wrote in his book in detail about that what were the criteria at that time to become a malik. He said that only those persons who provided intelligence to the British government against their respective tribes were favourites to become Maliks and if he failed to get Maliki through that, then he was bound to perform some acts of murder, plunder or other offences. In this way they were noticed, and in response they were rewarded as Maliks. For example, he said that Jagar a well-known Abdur Rahman Khel, Mahsud who continuously attacked British forces at Zhob and Bruce in response awarded him as Malik. Another Mahsud by the name of Mamik Khan kidnapped a Hindu and in response Bruce in return to free the Hindu awarded him as Malik for the sum of, 10 Rupees for month. Shah war Uddin Nazarkhel in order to get Maliki burn the grass and other food supplies of British cavalry horses and Mules of loading. He threatened the British government that, so for the British not make him as Malik he will do this again and again. He was rewarded finally. The author narrated an interview in his book from a man by the name of Sabir Khan, who was the eye witness of British period. Sabir Khan told him that becoming a Malik was not that easy at that time. He told the Author that in order to become a Malik he along with his friends Raided the Bannu Cantonment and captured some Breach Rifles from the local Sepoys, who were at night duty there. He told that in response the British government awarded him Maliki. The author of the book criticized the British policy at that time and regarded it as wrong and against the norms and values of tribal culture (Mahsud, 2016). The above examples show that most criminals and offenders were rewarded as Maliks and those men had no social status in their society. So how can a policy based on such ideals be successful in the long run, and that's why the system collapsed and the problem continuous (Mahsud, 2016). As Mr. Howell said, that "in close contact with the Mahsud, and if ever any Englishman claim to know them well, Mr. Bruce was the man". The claim of Mr. Howell about Mr. Bruce was laid on facts and in the light of this claim it was impossible for him to enlisted Men for Maliki based on such acts or offences. This may be true in some minor cases and he committed mistakes sometimes ignoring men of importance like Umar Khan, Yarik Khan etc which proved destructed for British government schemes later. However, on the whole the writer judged him wrongly (Howell, 1979). According to the interviews conducted by the authors, there is a difference of opinion among the local people regarding the selection of Maliks among the Mahsud tribe. Those who is ancestors are the beneficiaries of the system believe that, the British policy of the selection Maliks were on merits and they were the leading men among their family. They also of the opinion that the Mahsud accepted this policy on their own will. (Salman and Alam: personal communication, 2019, September, 18) On the other hand the young educated class believes that the British imposed this policy on Mehsud because they are powerful and the Mahsud accepted it unwillingly. Regarding the selection criteria they of the opinion that initially in the first step the selection was on merit but later on they give Malaki to the incompetent and notorious people. (Irfan, Marjan, Khalil and Rizwan, 2019)

Major Factors responsible for the Failure of Bruce Malik System:

1) Mr. Bruce followed the Sandeman model in Waziristan, which earlier proved successful in Baluchistan. The first and most important factor which contributed to the failure of Bruce Malik System among Mahsud and also in all over Waziristan tribes is the difference of Mahsud Society from that of Baloch. The Mahsud society has an egalitarian democratic Character, and they have a well organized social structure compared to Baluchistan were the Sandeman System proved successful because of the Baloch society weak social structure and hierarchical character. This special character of Mahsud society never allowed the British government to occupied places of strategic importance in Waziristan. On the other hand, it was much easier for the British to capture important strategic location in Baluchistan, and their weak social structure helped them (Khan, 2014).

2) The independent nature of Mahsud tribe and other Pathan Tribes of the region was another factor which created problems for the British government. The Earl of Northbrook discussed this issue in the British Parliament said that” I can conceive nothing more likely to create suspicion among these tribes than for them to see our officers at the top of their hills, surveying and making maps of their country; for these Pathan tribes are as jealous of their independence as the natives of Switzerland and other mountainous countries (Khan, 2014).

3) Another essential factor was, Sandeman system was quite successful and smoothly running in Balochistan compared to Mahsud area because the Baloch tribal chiefs were much power to control their respective tribes. Though, on the other hand, in Waziristan, the Maliks considered as” first among equals”. He cannot rule the tribe on his own. He requires the consent of every common man related to his tribe on all matters, whether small or big (Davis, 1975).

4) The Mahsud tribe has its tribal system, which was very different from the rest. The British government in order to control them, introduced laws and ideas which were not familiar to them and in response they faced tough resistance from the Mahsud, the frequent raid on Tank, their resistance during British expeditions against them and attacks on Wana Camps are the examples. Moreover, the introduction of new ideas destroyed their system, and it stopped the natural growth and development of their society (Khan, 2014).

5) The number of fighting men of the Mahsud tribe alone were some 8,000 at that time which were more than the combined strength of the two Major Baloch tribes of Marris and Bugtis, who were not more than six thousand. That was another factor which resisted the British efforts and remained a constant problem for the British selected Maliks, who were unable to control such large numbers of fighters (Khan, 2014).

6) The Maliks of Mahsud tribes received allowances from the government, and in return, they served the British government. These allowances make their position weaker instead of making them powerful. The local tribal people mostly considered them as traitors. Because of the opposition and propaganda of religious leaders (Mullahs) in many cases, the funeral ceremonies of the Maliks were not observed in Waziristan and especially in Mahsud tribe.

7) British were and were considered by the locals as an aggressor. They implement the Maliki system on Mahsud because of the powerful military administration. They appease the Maliks by giving them allowance and incentives but ignore the common people. In retaliation the local population did not tolerate them whenever they got an opportunity and always join the rival camps of the British. (Qureshi, 2019)

The emergence of Religious leadership to oppose Maliks: Mullah Powaindah a Shabi Khel, Alizai Mahsud, his real name was Mohiuddin. He was initially known as Selani Mullah, but when he became more politically activity, he changed his identity, and thus he became “Mullah Powindah”. He appears to have been the first Mahsud (at least in the British period) who claimed religious authority and to have something of a political leader in his own right. Throughout history, Charismatic religious leadership among Pashtoon have usually always remained outsiders. However, as a Mahsud, Mullah Powindah was not an outsider. He was accused in the killing of a local jailor, after that he sought refuge with an influential Dawar Malik, where he took the temporary title of “Badshash-i-Taliban”. By 1894 he became the leader of a local faction that was famous in hostility to the Maliks (Tribal Analysis Cell, 2012). He led the attack on Wana camp on 2nd November 1894, which caused great damages to both sides. From the British side forty-five killed and seventy-five wounded and the locals left behind some three hundred and fifty killed (Ahmad, 2017). In a short time, he was able to convince a large Jirga to give him the responsibility of dealing with the British, and in this way, he completely displaced the Maliks. He regularly received funds from the Afghan Amir’s and created problems for the British appointed Maliks and British government both (Tribal Analysis Cell, 2012). However, despite his leadership qualities and Statesmanship

skills, there were reported stories that some Mahsud leaders never accepted him as their leader and stated “You are a Mullah, stick to your traditional business (Ahmad, S. Akbar, 2004). Nevertheless, he was popular among the common people and always successful to gather people for their cause. During the interviews with the locals all consider him as a visionary and not a typical molvi.

The role of Afghanistan in Mahsud Tribe struggle against the British: The Amir’s of Afghanistan had claimed over Waziristan and other tribal areas which the British permanently occupied after Durand line agreement. The Viceroy in reply to a letter of the Afghan Amir’s clearly warned him to stop interference in Waziristan affairs (NDC papers). Throughout history, Afghanistan used the frontier tribes against the outside forces, and they often used religion as the common cause. In this way, the Mahsud tribal elders always had unique relations with Afghan Amir’s, and they received considerable amount of funds from Afghanistan. From Amir Sher Ali Khan to Amir Amanullah Khan they actively participated in the internal politics of Afghanistan and in the same way sought help of the Afghan Amir’s in the time of crises. They actively supported the religious leaders against the Malikis who were loyal to British government. Mullah Powindah received funds from Afghanistan until 1913 (Olesen, 1995).

Discussion and Conclusion

The struggle to maintain their independence was one of the reasons behind the resistance of the Mahsud tribe. Almost all the historian and especially the Colonial writers missed this point, and they confused the Mahsud tribe struggle for independence with Fanaticism. It was this free nature of the Mahsud tribe that they strongly resisted all the laws and ideas which were foreign to them. The tribals have historically been portrayed as a “violent” and “Warrior-like” both by the British and contemporary writers. However, a brief study of archival literature suggests that this representation of the tribal is based on various generalization policies of the British, that were formed during their military expeditions against the tribes of Waziristan and other areas (Yousaf, 2019). It is argued that the “violent” representation of tribes persisted mainly due to the absence of their counter-narrative is one of the reasons (Hanifi, 2016). The Maliki system though was not new to them in their society. The concept of elders was present before, but those elders of the tribe got their status through some extraordinary deeds of bravery, and they proved themselves through their intelligence. Historically, in the Pukhtoon society, those Elders (Maliks) remained on the disposal of administrators, but as far as the case of Mahsud Tribe is concerned we cannot claim this about them. They resisted Mughals and Sikh, who wanted to collect Taxes from them before British. The British selected Maliks but they did not consider the local culture and tradition, and they corrupt this system. The belief of the people on their elders was decreased because in the selection of Maliks the British authorities committed mistakes sometimes in the selection of wrong men on wrong places. Another essential reason in the failure of this system was the Cousins enmity (Turborwali), as the necessary feature for Pukhtoonwali (Lindholm, 1981), which created problems for the British. Turborwali, an essential feature of tribal culture, remains the main hurdle in the unification of a section or clan of Mahsud tribe under a Malik (Beattie, 1997). It was one of the results of the Maliki system which for the first time created a rival force against the Maliks in the shape of Religious Leaders (Mullahs), who resisted the Maliks and significantly undermined their activities. The Mahsud tribe has no fanatical tendencies like Dawar tribes of Waziristan. They always followed their local culture and traditions and sometimes they even discard religion when it offered to clash with their culture. The Mahsud tribe was the poorest of all the tribes of Waziristan. Because of financial gains the Malik faced jealousies and enmities within the clan or tribe, and this factor also affected their activities. The Malik system which was many times cancelled and then

adopted after modification was still in practice in Mahsud tribe as a legacy of the British period and therefore we cannot consider this system a total failure. It was because of this Middleman (Maliks), through him the State of Pakistan control these Tribes but due to policy changes and transition in the Mahsud Tribal society its worth and dignity was substantially damaged by the element of financial corruption (Sammon, 2008). However, after 9/11, due to shift in policies and the infusion of Taliban to Waziristan and Pakistan army military operations against them significantly damaged this system (Malik, 2013).

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