

Challenges of The Ethiopian Smallholding Farmers Under The Investment Policy

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Abstract

This academic article aimed to study the challenges of Ethiopian smallholding farmers under investment policy. It examined the land issues, peoples discourse on land and investment policy implementation. This article discussed the investment policy of Ethiopia with the concepts and theories of its implementation and found that a clear separation of policy formation from policy implementation for effective implementation wasn't fulfil the models of Mazmanian and Sabatier for it didn't include other stake holders, adequate structure, committed officials to the goals, and presence of detrimental changes in the socioeconomic framework conditions. This article also revealed that smallholding farmers burnt challenges of politicized investment for investors and other urban elites who offer support for the government obtain land they change it into capital at the expense of smallholdings and whenever the latter claimed their rights given political answer labeling them ant-development instead of open discussion, exposing them to, *inter alia*, food insecurity, identity deterioration, and unemployment. This followed with security forces systematically targeting certain ethnic groups, and 'open door' policy as it favors the investors more than smallholding farmers and local people

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resulting in human right violations, land grab, involuntary and forced eviction and displacement.

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Introduction

Investment and land policy are and have been the pivotal and sensitive political, economic and social issues in the contemporary history of Ethiopia. This comes, given the peoples discourse on land and agrarian nature of the country, where almost between 85% and 90% populations' income and livelihood depend on agriculture (Helland, 1999; Jemma, 2004; Financial Times, 2016). Few industries running in the country use raw materials coming directly or indirectly from the agriculture produced by smallholding farmers. More, majority source of GDP, foreign exchange and export earnings are generated from smallholding farmers while large commercial investment contributes less than 5% (Financial Times, 2016).

So far politics has played imperative role in deciding the property rights to land in Ethiopia (Jemma, 2004). Among other factors, land issue has been the most determining cause for the successive incoming, and outgoing Ethiopian governments. "Land to the tiller" slogan ignited the 1974 revolution, putting an end to the imperial government system (Darch, 1976). The provisional military administrative council, notably known as Derg-meaning "Committee" or "council", replaced the imperial government though liberated the farmers from the yoke of landlordism some of the gains of its land reform gradually were undermined because of heavy political intervention (Jemma, 2004). Similarly, the current government which replaced the Derg is facing heavy protests and resistances from the people, farmers and local communities as it continued the state ownership land policy of the former socialist government and

transferred huge lands to investors using investment policy as a means (Oakland Institute, 2011; Kachika, 2010; Rahmato, 2011; Al Jazeera, 2016).

Having both political and economic reasons the current land policy of Ethiopia gave land ownership right to the state and people leaving smallholding farmers with only usufruct right (Article 40/3 of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopian (FDRE) Constitution, 1995; Berhane, 2007). The political thinking is to keep the land of the people from being controlled by the few (riches) and to avoid the risk of endangering the democratic Process while the economic engrossed the existence of large farms is not mandatory for an economic growth though beneficial (Berhane, 2007; Rahmato, 2011). Nevertheless, the government itself ruled out these rationales, and never witnessed the respectation of the cause for the last quarter of century, of course, the opposite. The government averted the reasons and transferred huge lands to investors in the name of development establishing land bank where it can deposit lands and withdraw it easily for the rich and investors (Oakland Institute, 2011; Kachika, 2010; Rahmato, 2011; Financial Times, 2016).

The Ethiopian government outlined earning foreign currency, securing food security, creating job opportunity, and transferring technology as objectives, *inter alia*, for having the current investment policy (Investment Proclamation No. 769/2012). Looking from development view the policy appeared as a fortune of change. However, later, on its implementation it is found that the policy became an “open door” policy for it gives less protection to smallholding farmers and local people than investors (Oakland Institute, 2011; Bekele et al., 2015). The policy implemented with the government’s desire to associate land investment with the likely further marginalization of smallholders, transferring land to investor and others without prior information and consent of holders, adequate, prompt

and efficient compensation, using security forces which resulted in, inter alia, land grab, socio-economic change and human rights violation.

As mentioned above, the main objective of this article is to examine how the life of smallholding farmers endangered under the current investment policy. It goes on to address challenges the investment policy has on smallholding farmers. While these are the major questions, still there is no consolidated work done on the effects the investment policy of Ethiopia has on smallholding farmers and local communities from political, economic and social perspectives. This article is a modest attempt of a drop from the ocean to bring the subject matter into attention on the politicized policy implementation, land tenure, food security, endangering the farmers' life, human rights violation, changing land into capital. This will be projected providing some highlights on the policy while appreciating the current debate predicting the possible consequences the policies implementation would follow.

1. Policy implementation concepts and theories

Under the concept of policy implementation, the extent to which the policy objectives had been attained is not enough but what directives and plans policy makers mould to achieve them (Hargrove, 1975). Theoretically, the concept of policy implementation analysis offers evaluation techniques and guidance for the assessment of public program performance (Lane, 1983). Lane goes on and summarized it as “the concept of implementation belongs to a set of notions which is characterized by a surface clarity and comprises a problematic deep structure.” The process of carrying out and ensuring of the actual fulfillment of policy implementation needs concrete measures to provide instruments or means of practical expression for the very objectives of the policy.

This process of implementation refers to the bringing about of outcomes that are congruent with the original intention (s) by means of outputs (Hargrove, 1975). This concepts scope highlights that the investment policy implementation must picture the smallholding farmers' and local communities' interest the much-outlined objectives without prejudicing their very rights within certain period.

The concept of policy implementation provides that when considering any reform or major political decision it is essential to differentiate between the stated intentions and what was put into practice. Subsequently, the satisfaction of the very special relationship with each other follows successfulness of implementation (Nakamura, & Smallwood, 1980).

On the other hand, the theory of implementation assumes that the public policy becomes a legitimate concern for implementers once it has been decided upon in formally defined ways. The more alternatives that are not ruled out by the formulator the greater the autonomy of the implementer in the implementation consisting everyday problem-solving strategies of “street-level bureaucrats” (Lipsky, 1980). This would be happened and best practiced when the policy is made and implemented for and by the people. Nevertheless, Ethiopian smallholders and street-level-bureaucrats are far from being part of policy formatter as the country is following developmental state ideology and the governing elite emphasis on decisions of central policy makers- top-down (DeLeon, 2001; Araya, 2013).

The top-down theorists start from the assumption that policy objectives are set out by central policy makers (Pressman, & Wildavsky, 1973) the house of people's representative in Ethiopia. The house makes the policy whereas the executives proclaim regulation for implementation.

On this, Pressman and Wildavsky found that setting goals of policy and their implementation have linear relationship for the latter implies adequate bureaucratic procedures to ensure that the former executed it accurately as much as possible (Pressman, & Wildavsky, 1973). Theoretically, the house of people's representative having made the policy and then passes it on to the executive branch of the government for implementation with clear responsibility and hierarchical control to supervise the action of implementers. However, the house is incapacitated to exercise its legal authority by the executives let alone structuring the implementation games thoughtfully (Bardach, 1977; Araya, 2013). Sabatier and Mazmanian assumed a clear separation of policy formation from policy implementation (Mazmanian, & Sabatier, 1983). For effective implementation, their model lists six criteria discussed below in line with Ethiopian top-down made investment policy.

a. Policy objectives are clear and consistent

The major objectives of investment policy promulgated in the preamble of proclamation No. 769/2012; is to accelerate the country's economic development through exploitation of natural resources of the country, develop domestic market, increase foreign exchange earnings by enhancing exports and producing import-substituting products locally; and create job opportunities (Proclamation No. 769/2012). The objectives clarity and logicality seems normal from the perspectives of the concepts of policy stages. Currently, the objectives firmly holding with and adhering to the situations happening in the country leaves them consistent. Nevertheless, political, economic and social wellbeing of the country lags far behind the rest of the world though the policy has dreams of fortunes due to the unkept objectives and promises of the policy. The unemployment rate swipes all corner of the land, the hard currency problem reaches out

the ceiling making the government badly in need of foreign exchange, and the country's food insecurity hovers millions between death and life (World Bank, 2014).

b. The program is based on a valid causal theory

As a developmental state ideology based, government's objectives are always right and need to be executed at the expense of smallholders in the name of development (Araya, 2013). Likewise, the policy advocates postmodern theory which swiped off society's values, identity, culture, custom and etc. The smallholding farmers and community want to develop being themselves within the investment policy implementation that integrates their administration, ownership and identity into account which the policy implementation ignored (Bekele et al., 2015; Wickeri, & . Kalhan, 2010).

c. The implementation process is structured adequately

The implementation processes designation should be on a balanced and concrete bureaucrat to execute to the extent further possibility. Sabatier and Mazmanian argued that policy makers could ensure effective implementation through adequate program designed with a smart structuration of the implementation process (Sabatier, & Mazmanian, 1979). Nevertheless, the policy maker has lost such power to executives failing to provide implementation structure which result in huge land, 7 million hectares, transfer to investors at the expense of smallholding farmers and inadequate performance on the handed-on land (Rahmato, 2011; Oakland Institute, 2011; The Reporter Newspaper, 2016).

d. Implementing officials are committed to the program's goals

In 2016 the megaproject-the Ethiopian Sugar Corporation (ESC), which is going on smallholding farmers land has found itself in a grave

financial crisis due to corruption resulting in completing any of its projects (The Reporter Newspaper, 2016; trans international, 2014). ESC, is one of the result of investment policy the country adopted, aimed to execute the government's ambitious plan to establish a giant sugar industry to supply sugar and by products to both domestic and neighboring markets, open high job opportunities within the first five years of its strategic planning period- Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), which concluded in July 2015 unsuccessfully after having invested more than 77 billion birr (\$4 billion) within the last six years and it is now on the verge of ceasing its duties because of a critical financial crisis it has encountered due to the officials uncommitted to the goals of the policy (The Reporter Newspaper, 2016).

e. Interest groups and (executive and legislative) sovereigns are supportive.

Since it has taken the power the current government of Ethiopia has conducted 5 national elections claiming the entire the winner with landslide victory (National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE), 2015). The interest groups such as journalist, opposition parties, NGOs, international institutions, human right activists, medias etc. have no place in bringing out voices of voiceless to be heard or comment on the policies. The government controlled all the medias using its anti-terror legislation to crack down on oppositions and journalism, making difficulties with election, interfere with the campaigns, bans charities and civic societies and the executive controlled the two branches of the government-legislature and judiciary, violated the sovereignty of the groups and mutual support they could contribute to one another (Charities and Societies proclamation, Proc.no. 621/2009; Amnesty International, 2012; Anti-Terrorism Proc. No. 652/2009).

f. There are no detrimental changes in the socioeconomic framework conditions.

The Ethiopian investment policy has also changed the agrarian nature, livelihood, separated families and neighbors, cleared forests, lost wildlife habitat, displaced and evicted smallholding farmers and local people (Oakland Institute, 2011; Rahmato, 2010; Araya, 2013). All these happened for there is no process to ensure that land investment is happening in appropriate areas to find a balance of land uses across the landscape. Most importantly, the socioeconomic was detrimentally changed for the policy didn't come from the bottom, prioritizing the interest of the smallholding farmers and local people. More, nothing put in place to ensure that local people benefit from the business opportunities that these investments could present holding their socioeconomic (Bekele et al., 2015). Smallholding farmers and local people bear the brunt of the adverse impacts of these investments, while realizing none of the benefits. In many cases, local indigenous people already live on the margins of poverty, land tenure insecurity, discrimination, segregation, desperate to find a job and face chronic food insecurity tightened with rampant ethnic conflict in the territory land taken by investors and it is unlikely that many groups would be able to flee to nearby countries and regions for the land that forms their identity is gone and nothing remaining for the next generation and there is nowhere for them to go only looking their bleak future (Oakland Institute, 2011; Rahmato, 2011; Araya, 2013).

Consequently, the clear separation of policy formation from policy implementation for effective implementation doesn't fulfil the above models of Mazmanian and Sabatier for it didn't include other stake holders, adequate structure, committed officials to the goals, and presence of detrimental changes in the socioeconomic framework conditions.

1. Politicized Investment Policy Implementation

The current investment policy implementation going on smallholding farmers' land in Ethiopia suits Alston's saying, "changes in property rights generally involve winners and losers" (Alston, 1996). The constitution of Ethiopia explicitly made the state and peoples the owner of both rural and urban land including all natural resources (FDRE Constitution article 42/3). Accordingly, the state has constitutional land ownership right and can sell, exchange or mortgage enforcing the smallholders leave the land they use whenever the government demands, believes that the land is needed for "public purposes", or that the land can be used more efficiently by investors, cooperative societies and other public or private entities (Araya, 2013). In such cases, even though the government has an obligation to pay a proper compensation (FDRE Constitution article 40/6; Proclamation No. 455/2005), many land holders whose land has been alienated either they never been compensated or the compensation paid has been inadequate and unfair (Rahmato, 2011). As a result, smallholding farmers lost their property rights and the compensation has better paid while the state and investors are enjoying the foreign currency, and cheap labor, contiguous land and congenial business environment respectively (Oakland Institute, 2011; Financial, 2016).

State land ownership and unfair compensation payment show that government's political desire to associate land investment with the likely further politically, economically and socially marginalize/disempower) of the indigenous people to control and increase their dependence on government for their needs, and fight rebel groups operating in the lowland areas by relocating evicted smallholding farmers there (Oakland Institute, 2011). More, the granting of land-based assets to the Tigray³ and other urban elites who offer support for the EPRDF further sends the message

3. Tigray Region is the northernmost of the nine regions of Ethiopia. The current Ethiopian ethnic group political power holder

that support of the government will result in preferential treatment (Oakland Institute, 2011). From Oakland Institute argument, the investment policy implementation is inclined toward executing the political agenda of governments to sustain its power rather than the objectives of the policy, *inter alia*, food security, and job opportunity.

Further, certification and registration of smallholding farmers' land couldn't prevent public authorities from expropriating land, natural resources and leasing out thousands of lands to private investors (Araya, 2013; Oakland Institute, 2011). This is happening mainly for two reasons: first, because of the ideology followed by the current government a "development mission", the dominant power of the state is justified as necessary and in the state's ideology, Revolutionary Democracy, one find arguments used to declare the state as the legitimate and sole actor in the society which executes the policy at the expense of smallholding farmers. The second reason comes from the current land system in Ethiopia that the smallholder farmers have no ownership land right as they do not enjoy sound security of tenure and have only limited rights that are conditional and subject to abrogation at any time.

2. Human Rights Violation

In 2007 the UN committee that monitors the implementation of the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) reported that it alarmed with security forces "systematically targeting" certain ethnic groups with summary executions, rape of women and girls, arbitrary detention, torture, humiliations, and destruction of property and crops of members of the communities whose land is needed for investment" (United Nations, 2007). More, in 2003 based on the strategic location of the Anuak's traditional lands Ethiopian

People's Democratic Revolutionary Front (EPDRF) security forces and other groups imprisoned many more, tortured, beaten, exiled 8000 to 10000 to neighboring Sudan and killed 424 Anuak⁴ in Gambella⁵ region just to implement the investment going on in the areas (Human Rights Watch, 2002). Moreover, according to United Nation's Independent Expert on Minority Issues report on Ethiopia an unknown number of minority communities have already disappeared completely due to investment policy implementation (United Nation, 2007). Further, recently, from late 2015 until May 2016 the human rights watch (HRW) reported based on more than 125 interviews with witnesses, victims, and government officials that the government security forces used excessive and lethal force against Oromo⁶ Peaceful protests (Human Rights Watch, 2016). The protesters protested the government's plan which dislocates over 2 million smallholding farmers for many of whom have been displaced for development projects over decade benefitting only small elite while having a negative impact on local farmers and communities. The execution of the policy uses resettlement, eviction, displacement, igniting conflict between bordering ethnicities, force, assimilation, cultural dilution, environmental degradation and took away their land which is the reason for the minority's extinction. The smallholding farmers exposed to the challenges of total loss of their life, identity and property. The democratic developmental ideology of the government linked with postmodernism theory exacerbates the values, custom, traditions, culture and human rights of the community leasing out larger areas of their land to investors.

4. Luo Nilotic ethnic group inhabiting parts of Ethiopia and South Sudan

5. Gambella is one of the 9th regions that form the federation of Ethiopia.

6. The largest ethnic group in Ethiopia and the wider Horn of Africa, at approximately 34.5% of Ethiopia's population according to the 2007 census

The report also highlights the case of Karayu⁷ pastoralists who have been displaced from their traditional land and water sources in Oromia (Oakland Institute, 2011). It fundamentally put human rights at stake-the rights to life, food, job, property and shelter (Cotula et al., 2009).

Most importantly, the Ethiopian government passed two infamous laws; the Charities Proclamation Societies no. 621/2009 and anti-terrorism proclamation no.652/2009 that criminalize and suspend most independent human rights work, opposition parties and NGOs. Using these laws, the government shipped to prison or crackdown dissent parties or anybody who criticizes the policy labeling them anti-development, terrorist, rent-seeking and undemocratic.

3. Land grab

Many livelihoods of smallholding farmers are being insecure in Ethiopia as land is becoming lucrative for foreign agricultural and biofuel investors. The growing interest in investment in the country seems to have nothing or little to do with investment needs of small scale farming (Araya, 2013; Rahmato, 2011; Financial Times, 2016). Though land grabbing is termed as “foreign investment in land” or “large-scale land acquisitions” its definition goes beyond and covers the purchasing, taking possession of, and/or controlling of poor developing countries, food insecure nations’ land by the wealthier to produce crops and fuels for export (Kachika, 2010; Sheppard Daniel with Anuradha Mittal, 2009; Oxfam, 2012). However, the discourse the Oromo nation-the single majority ethnic group of the country has on land is very deep and inconsistent with the government’s ideology on land and investment policy including implementations. In Oromo nation’s discourse, land is considered as a bone “Dubbiiin lafaa dubbi

7. An Oromo tribe residing in the eastern part of Oromia

lafeet" meaning 'a land issue is a matter of bone'. The Oromo uses this discourse for land is the very foundation for human life and existence. It is Oromo's believe that land and bone is the base of human; to be successful and sustain as a nation land must be in the hands of the holder or the later must see himself in what going on his land. The bone produces the blood that carries oxygen through our body; the bone holds up our flesh; our bone determines our height and width. As only one with healthy bone can stand and walk upright on two legs nation would not exist keeping its identity once evicted from its land. The land bears the communities values even after death. More, Oromo has this saying on land "Lafarratti kufan lafa qabatanii lafaa ka'u" meaning, 'fall on the land/ ground/ and hold itself to rise up'. If you hold or own your land you will be the beneficiaries. The contrary reading shows that once the land is taken away it is difficult to have a place to fell let alone to rise for losing the land results in the clearance of language, custom, social life and culture both as an individual and a community. As a result, its consequence is all-political, economic and social. The discourse goes far to include- land is all what we eat and drink-our lives; our soil, our identity; - who we are! Subsequently, the Oromos want to develop and see themselves in the policy implemented on their land. The investment policy's enforcement on smallholding farmers land hasn't only a problem of implementation but it doesn't let them fell on their land-didn't give them opportunity to work in the project going on their land. Instead it grabbed the land leaving them empty hand. The other factor that exacerbates the smallholding farmers' challenges under the investment policy implementation is the fact that regional and federal governments are directly or indirectly behind the land grabbing (Kachika, 2010; Oxfam, 2012; Davison, 2016).

How does investors' or anybody's land acquisition turned into land grab? Oxfam has stipulated that when investors or anybody do one or more of the following;

- a. violate human rights, particularly the equal rights of women;
- b. flout the principle of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC)
- under which affected communities are informed about and can give or refuse consent to a project;
- c. are not based on a thorough assessment of, or disregard, social, economic and environmental impacts, including the way they are gendered;
- d. avoid transparent contracts with clear and binding commitments on employment and benefit-sharing;
- e. Eschew democratic planning, independent oversight and meaningful participation.

Civil society, human rights group, smallholders' farmers associations, scientists, opposition political parties and academicians argued that Ethiopian investment policy implementation threatened the smallholding farmers' human rights, scorn free consent, food security, ignored environmental and socio-economic impacts; no contracts; no governance, no constraints, none of that and left making the investors business as who to hire and fire (Oakland Institute, 2011; Katicha, 2011; Araya, 2013; Rahmato, 2011; Anderson et al., 2010; Bekele et al., 2015; Financial Times, 2016; Davis, 2010). By 2016 Ethiopia has already transferred 7 million hectares of land to investors (Oakland Institute, 2011; Rahmato, 2011; Financial Times, 2016). Smallholding farmers handed on the land they have been using before under the above stated situations-Land grab. The international community and human rights watch criticized the investment policy of Ethiopia as 'open door' policy as it favors the investors more

than smallholding farmers and local people (Bekele et al., 2015). And the policies objectives never witnessed so far.

4. Changing the land into capital

In the process of translating policy into action, administrators, officers and officials must implement these policies according to the very intentions of the decision makers (Hill, & Hupe, 2002). The implementers should give emphasis on the implementation that consists of everyday problem-solving strategies of “street-level bureaucrats” (Lipsky, 1980). However, Ethiopian government handed huge land-Belgium size- to investor just to earn foreign exchange (William, 2010; Oakland Institute, 2011; Bekele et al., 2015; Rahmato, 2011; Kachika, 2010; Financial Times, 2016). The investment policy implementation powered top officials and officers to make the lower bureaucrats and smallholders hastily transfer the land to investor. The government has established federal land bank to further facilitate the process through which investors acquire the land (Oakland Institute, 2011). The smallholding farmers’ land deposited in it to easily withdraw whenever the investor comes. These lands are large contiguous blocks of land given to foreign investors in lease areas of at least 5,000 ha by simply withdrawing it from the bank just like a cash. Refusing the order from the above automatically would follow labels of anti-development, rent seeker or anti-government even if it is a constitutional right to do so.

The general trend among all reports is that there are between 3.6 and 4.5 million ha of land available for commercial land investment in the country between 2010 and 2015 (Rahmato, 2011). As quoted in OI a spokesperson for Agriculture Investment Support Directorate (AISD) stated that 1.2 million ha are available in Oromia, 1.4 million ha in Benishangul, 1.2 million ha in Gambella, and 0.3 million ha in SNNPR. Of that, 1.7 million

ha from Gambella (7 parcels 830,000 ha), SNNPR (4 parcels, 180,000 ha) and Benishangul (4 parcels, 692,000 ha) have been deposited in the federal land bank (Oakland Institute, 2011).

Table 1 : Lands in Federal Land Bank and Market by FDRE

	Overall ha available	Number of parcels	Average Size	Area of region	% of region being offered
Gambella	829,199	7	118,457	2,580,200	32%
SNNPR	180,625	4	45,156	11,093,100	2%
Benishangul	691,984	4	172,996	4,928,900	14%
Afar	409,678	9	45,520	9,670,700	4%
Total	2,111,486	24	87,979		

Source: Oakland Institute (2011)

Although those lands are under regional governments they will be given out to investors by federal government due to the creation of the federal land bank the former have lost control over large tracts of land in their own jurisdiction, and that the federal government now manages those lands without their involvement and leasing out to the investor changing the land into capital (Bekele et al., 2015; Araya, 2013; Rahmato, 2011; Kachika, 2010; Financial Times, 2016).

Legatafo Case; In Legetafo, found at the outskirt of the capital-Finfinne (Addis Ababa), Oromia region, after the 60-year-old smallholding farmer told Bloomberg that local government officials convinced him to accept an offer or face expropriation. He took the cash and vacated the land paid 17 birr (\$0.80) a square meter in compensation. Meanwhile, people were bidding as much as 355,555 birr (\$16,732) birr per square meter to rent land in Addis Ababa last year (Davison, 2016). The farmer used the 200,000 birr he received for the plot for expenses including

renting more farmland leaving his children to work as cleaners, earning 40 birr a day. Likewise, investors leased also wait until the land prices increase and then transfer to third person upon profit (Oakland Institute, 2011). The officials and investors use the smallholding farmers' land as a commodity and sell out whenever they accrue interest on it.

Table 2 : Beneficiaries, losers and latter's challenges under Ethiopian investment policy implementation

Beneficiaries from Investment Policy	What do they benefit	Losers	Challenges of losers
1. Federal government	Revenue/taxes/and improved relations with foreign government who are investing	Smallholding farmers and local communities	a. Influx from Outsiders b. Negative political, economic and social impacts c. Lost self-sufficiency d. Lost communal areas and ancestral lands e. Environmental degradation
2. Regional governments	Solidarity support from federal government	Downstream users	Downstream Water resource degradation
3. District administrator	Collaboration with investors and get some benefits		
4. Highlanders	Employment/Labor/		
5. Investors	Profitable produce. Tigrayans and urban elites awarded land at rock-bottom price. They either transfer or sell once land market formalized and price increased		
6. Other businesses	For they are located outside of the areas of intensive land investment		

Source: Authors elaboration

Conclusion

Under the Ethiopian investment policy smallholding farmers and local people including the urban residents burnt challenges as the government established federal land bank to deposit lands as cash evicting smallholding farmers and local communities to easily withdraw it for investors.

In the process of policy implementation, the bringing about of outcomes that are congruent with the original intention(s) by means of outputs aren't taken into consideration. Objectives of the investment policy listed as creating job opportunity, earning foreign currency, increasing the economy of the country, technology transfer and food security ended up emphasizing only on obtaining foreign currency. With the concept of policy implementation in the case of investment policy of Ethiopia the static aspects of the identification of a policy, a set of outcomes and the relationships between them failed to match. Dynamically, in the process, how policies are carried out in an environment conducive to policy accomplishment or failure-stages of implementation smallholding farmers and local people didn't see themselves in it. Theoretical foundation of public policy given pertinent base in the implementation assuming it becomes a legitimate concern for implementers once it has been decided upon in formally defined ways. Accordingly, the investment policy of Ethiopia presently has come from top-down as the top officials and ruling elites run the country with the revolutionary democracy-the state knows best than others ideology. Consequently, a clear separation of policy formation from its implementation for effectiveness of its implementation has not fulfil the models of Mazmanian and Sabatier.

Smallholding farmers threatened from the politicized investment policy implementation for the government's desire to associate land investment with the likely further marginalization/ disempowerment/ of the indigenous people to increase their dependence on government for food security, and increased difficulty for rebel groups to operate in the lowland areas. Granting lands to the ethnic political power holder-Tigray, and elites who support the governing party, respective regional governments unable to administer and control lands in land bank, land registration and

certifications ineffective in preventing public authorities from expropriating smallholding farmers land further sends the message that support of the government will result in preferential treatment. Next, governments' security forces systematically targeting certain ethnic groups with summary executions, rape of women and girls, arbitrary detention, torture, humiliations, and destruction of property and crops of members of those communities violated their human rights. Land grab happened when investors or anybody do human rights violations, flout free, prior and informed consent principle, not based on thorough assessment of environmental impacts, avoid transparent contracts and/or undemocratic planning while acquiring land is another challenges farmer facing. The land and investment policy implementation went inconsistent with the peoples' land discourse. Lastly, the government directly or indirectly, and investors are using land changing into capital become another smallholding farmers provocation.

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