

Ethnic Conflict and Peace Process: A Comparative Study in Aceh and Mindanao

SuttiluckSangsuwan

Abstract

The paper applies comparative framing analysis to explore ethnic conflict and peace process in Aceh, Indonesia and Mindanao, Philippines. The objectives of the paper are to study the ethnic conflicts, the peace process and analyze why the conflict in Aceh has been resolved and Mindanao has not.

The grievance of the ethnic conflicts in Aceh and Mindanao are over human rights violations, the imbalance of economic policies, the setting of unjust social policies, and an ignorance of local values by the governments. The Aceh conflict was resolved after the signing of the Helsinki peace agreement between the Indonesia government and Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) mediated by the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) in 2005. On the other hand, the 1976 Tripoli Agreement for special autonomy, the 1987 Jeddah Accord for expanding of autonomy and the 1996 Final Peace Agreement have been signed between Manila government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNFL) but the conflict is still on-going.

The successful resolution of the Aceh conflict was due to the political will of the Indonesian government, the unity of the rebel group, the third-party mediator, the special autonomy and the Tsunami. The obstacles for conflict resolution in southern Philippines are a lack of the political will by the Manila government, insurgency groups, weak mediator as the third party and spoilers.

Key word: ethnic conflict, peace process, peace agreement, conflict resolution, autonomy

บทคัดย่อ

บทความทางวิชาการนี้เป็นการนำเสนอความขัดแย้งทางชาติพันธุ์และหนทางสู่สันติภาพในกรอบของการเปรียบเทียบระหว่างอาเจะห์ ประเทศอินโดนีเซียและมินดาเนาประเทศฟิลิปปินส์ จุดประสงค์ของงานวิจัยคือการศึกษาความขัดแย้ง กระบวนการสร้างสันติภาพและวิเคราะห์ความสำเร็จในการสร้างสันติภาพในอาเจะห์และความล้มเหลวในมินดาเนา

สาเหตุของความขัดแย้งในอาเจะห์และมินดาเนาคือ การละเมิดสิทธิมนุษยชน ความไม่เท่าเทียมกันของนโยบายเศรษฐกิจของรัฐบาล ความไม่ยุติธรรมของนโยบายทางสังคมและการเพิกเฉยของรัฐบาลต่อคุณค่าของชนท้องถิ่น ความขัดแย้งในอาเจะห์สิ้นสุดลงหลังจากการเซ็นสัญญาสันติภาพเฮลซิงกิระหว่างรัฐบาลอินโดนีเซียกับขบวนการอาเจะห์เสรี (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka: GAM) โดยได้รับการประสานงานจากองค์การริเริ่มเพื่อการบริหารจัดการภาวะวิกฤต (Crisis Management Initiative: CMI) ในปีพ.ศ. 2548 ในขณะที่เดียวกันรัฐบาลฟิลิปปินส์กับแนวร่วมปลดปล่อยแห่งชาติโมโร (Moro National Liberation Front: MNFL) ก็มีการเซ็นสัญญาสันติภาพ 3ฉบับคือ ข้อตกลงตริโปลีในปีพ.ศ.2519 ข้อตกลงเจดดาห์ในปีพ.ศ.2530 และสนธิสัญญาสันติภาพสุดท้ายในปี2539 แต่ความขัดแย้งยังคงไม่สิ้นสุดจนในปัจจุบัน

เหตุผลที่ทำให้การแก้ปัญหาความขัดแย้งในอาเจะห์ประสบความสำเร็จคือ เจตจำนงทางการเมืองของรัฐบาลอินโดนีเซียที่ต้องการสร้างสันติภาพในภูมิภาค ความเป็นอันหนึ่งอันเดียวของกลุ่มแบ่งแยกดินแดน ตัวกลางในการเจรจา และเหตุการณ์ไม่คาดคิดคือภัยธรรมชาติซึนามิ ส่วนอุปสรรคในการสร้างสันติภาพในมินดาเนาคือการขาดเจตจำนงในการแก้ปัญหาความขัดแย้งของรัฐบาล ความขัดแย้งแตกแยกภายในกลุ่มแนวร่วมการแบ่งแยกดินแดน ผลประโยชน์ทับซ้อนของตัวกลางในการเจรจาและความล้มเหลวในการจัดการเขตปกครองตนเองในมินดาเนา

คำสำคัญ: ความขัดแย้ง, กระบวนการสันติภาพ, ข้อตกลงสันติภาพ, การแก้ปัญหาความขัดแย้ง, เขตการปกครองตนเอง

Ethnic Conflict and Peace Process: A Comparative Study in Aceh and Mindanao

SuttiluckSangsuwan

After gaining independence from Western colonisation, ethnic conflict has become a serious issue in Southeast Asia. Conflicts emerged in the form of rebellion or armed separatism toward the central government that threaten the region's security. For example, the armed movement in Aceh, South Philippines, Timor Leste, Karen in Myanmar and Southern Thailand. Even though Thailand has never been colonised, the ethnic conflict was a result of Western domination in the region. Some conflicts have been settled by achieving independence or peace negotiations such as in Timor Leste and Aceh respectively, but in certain regions the violence is still ongoing.

Peace agreement is an option which many international actors rely on to prevent the recurrence of the war. Stedman argues the process of carrying out a specific peace agreement, he states that success is measured in relation to the ending of violence and the conclusion of war on a self-enforcing basis such as when the outsiders or third parties leave; the former warring parties refrain from returning to war and there is long term peace building. (2002,3) An example is Aceh, Indonesia's westernmost province, in this case a peace accord was signed by both the government of Indonesia (GOI) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) on 15 August 2005 aimed to end more than thirty years of war (Mietzner 2012, 88). Before the peace agreement was signed in 2005, there had been several attempts to make peace and all ended in failure. The Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), an organisation led by former Finnish president Maarti Ahtisaari based in Helsinki, Finland, played a critical role as a mediator between the two conflicting sides (Askandar 2007, 255-256). The Aceh peace process has brought a fast normalisation of both social and security conditions in the province. The Jakarta government followed the promises of an amnesty for imprisoned insurgents and provided regional autonomy arrangement (Mietzner 2012, 88). The peace in Aceh inspires actors who seek and hope for peace in areas of Southeast Asia still under conflict.

On the other hand, Mindanao, southern Philippines, is another conflict area in Southeast Asia where peace negotiations took place many times between the Philippines government and the armed separatist movement known as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The Tripoli Agreement in 1978 created two autonomous regions covering ten provinces, however, it failed in establishing peace. Further attempts were made in January 1987 when the Aquino Government and the MNLF signed the Jeddah Accord, opening the possibility of expanding the areas of autonomy to twenty-three provinces in southern Philippines. In September 1998, the Government and the MNLF signed the "Final Peace Agreement on the implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement" In Jakarta (Quimpo 2012, 117-118). In addition, the "Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral

Domain" (MOA-DA) was signed between the Manila government and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in August 2008, in Putrajaya, Malaysia (Quimpo 2012, 114). The agreement provided expanded regional autonomy for Bangsamoro¹ (Moro nation) in Mindanao. But the charters could not end the conflict of the area and all failed in building and setting peace. Until October 2012, a pact was signed between the MILF and Manila government to create of an autonomous region in Muslim-majority Mindanao with more powers, territory and control over resources (ICG 2012). This has not yet guaranteed peace in Mindanao as it has experienced the failure of accords since the first agreement in 1978 and the conflict remains even until at the present.

The peace process has been settled in both Aceh and Mindanao by outside third parties who act as facilitators and mediators for negotiations and peace agreements; however, in each case the result has been different. Aceh achieved conflict resolution with peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building whereas in Mindanao negotiation failed to solve the conflicts. Therefore, this paper seeks to solve the question: Why has the peace process succeeded in Aceh (Indonesia) but failed in Mindanao (Philippines)?

The reason of choosing Aceh in Indonesia and Mindanao in the southern Philippines is the similarity of the conflict and the conflict management but the outcome of the two cases is completely different. Both cases are ethnic conflicts which eventually become separatism because of grievances. The two conflicts have brought a big effect towards the people in two areas resulting in the death, human rights violation, obstructing economic productivity and social devaluation. Moreover, in the peace process, the mediators involve and play an important role in assisting the countering parties to sign an agreement and achieve the goals after signing the agreement. The essay is divided into four parts; the root and grievances of the two conflicts, the peace processes, the critical points of success in Aceh and failure in Mindanao and a conclusion. The theories of grievance, the third party guarantee, mediator, spoiler, and autonomy are all reviewed and discussed through the paper.

Root of Conflicts and Grievances

The conflicts in Aceh and Mindanao occurred long time ago. During the colonisation, Aceh fought the Dutch and the Moros were preoccupied by Spain and the U.S.A.

Aceh had long been in the centre of a colonial conflict between the Dutch and the British, who both wanted to integrate the Muslim sultanate into their trade empires (Mietzner 2012, 90). During 1940s, the Acehnese was enthusiastic to end colonial rule and allow Aceh to become a self-governing province within the Indonesian Union. Aceh donated an airplane to Sukarno's government, and local Muslim militias to fight with the Dutch (Mietzner 2012, 90). However, Indonesian government rejected federalism and applied a unitary state after the Dutch left the territory in 1950. From then on, the relationship between Aceh and Jakarta rapidly and substantially got worse (Mietzner 2012, 91). Daud Beureuh, the revered former governor of Aceh, declared in

¹ In the MOA-DA, Bangsamoro refers to "those natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization and their descendants whether mixed or of full native blood (Quimpo 2012, 134).

1953 that Aceh was now part of the Darul Islam movement. Aceh's first insurgency against the Indonesian Government had begun. The rebellion, however, was not separatism in nature, but rather a movement to force the government to turn Indonesia into an Islamic state (Christie 1996).

In 1959, the government granted Aceh a 'special territory' (daerah istimewa) with extra rights in local government and implementation of parts of Islamic law. Thus, Daud Beureuh ended the revolt in exchange for promises from Jakarta after official negotiations with the Indonesian Government in 1962 (Mietzner 2012, 91). Nevertheless, the conflict re-emerged in the 1970s when Suharto determined to establish a standardised system of administration control cross the state by military-dominated New Order regime (Christie 1996, 158). Furthermore, the discovery of oil and gas in Aceh brought the increasing arrival of Javanese official and non-Acehnese workers. The social gap between the migrants and the locals became wider and deeper. An ignorance to the social issues led to the emergence of Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) seeking completely independence from the Republic (Mietzner 2012, 92). The following presidents; Habibie, Wahid, and Megawati, attempted to resolve the Aceh conflict through negotiations but when the negotiations failed, they all operated military operation against the Acehnese (Askandar 2007; Mietzner 2012).

From the historical background of Aceh, it showed that since the independence in 1945, the Indonesian Government ignored and never helped Aceh, whereas the Acehnese assisted the Republic government and received nothing in exchange. Reid states 'Indonesia had needed Aceh far more than Aceh has needed Indonesia' (2006, 107).

In southern Philippines, before 1970s, the overall situation was tense and critical in term of security. The sporadic armed clashes between groups of Muslims and Christian had grown into a war. Mercado argues two myths leading to the existing prejudices on both sides and the formation of two opposing mass movements. The first myth presented the Moros as the cause of the Christian woes by the refusal to abandon their old ways. The other was the Christians as criminals in suffering of the Moro masses (Mercado 1984, 154-155).

Moreover, Kreuzer argues the causes of contemporary Mindanao conflicts. The first is a fundamental demographic and socioeconomic marginalisation of Muslim their territories. The second is the stabilisation of new collective identity as Moros in a Christian land. The third is the development of Islamic and nationalistic counter-elites since the 1950s. The fourth is the escalation of the political contestation between the two political parties, the Nacionalistas and the Liberals, in the course of which level of political violence increased significantly since the mid-1960s (2005, 22-23).

The Jabitah massacre was a main incident of the emergence a new Islamic consciousness and turned to the critical rationale for all subsequent separatist movement. (Rodell 2007,228). The Jabitah massacre happened in March 1968 when some Muslim military trainees engaged in secret commando-style training. The commandos were allegedly being trained to agitate among people of Sabah and North Borneo to demand annexation by the Philippine Republic (Mercado 1984, 155). For reasons that are still unclear, the programme soon deteriorated to such a degree that the trainees attempted to petition President Marcos about their grievances (Rodell 2007, 228). Then all the recruits were massacred. The congressional investigation did not

result in bringing the culprits to justice (Mercaso 1984, 156).

In addition Marcos' imposition of martial law in 1972 triggered a Moro uprising and then became a war between the Government and MNLF, Moro rebels which led by Nur Misuari (Quimpo 2012, 116). The original organisation to oppose the government, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), was formed as a direct response to the Jabidah massacre. Then the organisation broke to Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) combining of pragmatic and religion factors in the operation (Rodell 2007, 225).

In summarise, historical issues have been important factors in contributing the conflicts. These grievances are over identity, human rights, government administration, and natural resources.

The identity or different ethnic issue has risen in both Aceh and Mindanao. Aceh has been recognised as a minority in Indonesia with strong Islam identity (McCulloch 2005, 2, 20). Darul Islam and GAM's both requested an Islamic state, although the GAM's main objective was separatism. In Mindanao, it is the conflict comes from the unsuccessful integration of the Muslim population into a Christian dominated society. Moreover, the region of Mindanao was Muslim during Spanish colonial times but under the United States and then the independent Philippine Republic; Christian Filipinos encroached on Muslim lands and came to dominate much of the region's religious and political life (Rodell 2007, 225). Walter argues that the war that are fought between competing identity groups are believed to be particular intractable (2009, 5)

The second grievance is on human rights abuses. Violations of human rights committed by the various governments have been a main contributing factor to the conflict. One such violation in Aceh was DOM (Military Operation Zone) from 1990 to 1998, giving the army free rein to crush the separatists (Askandar 2007, 250). The conflict in Aceh had become about family and friends who have suffered violence, death, or who have disappeared, been tortured, raped and harassed by the police and military (McCulloch 2005, 20). In Mindanao, the massacre of innocent young Muslim recruits in the Philippine Army led to the grievances.

Additionally, the broken promises of the governments in implementing autonomy in Aceh and Mindanao cause continued uprising in the areas. The sense of injustice among the locals increased due to the imbalance of economic policies, the setting of unjust social policies, and ignorance of local values shown by the government. The fundamental causes of local people's grievances in Aceh and Mindanao could not be solved by military operation.

Finally, exploitation of natural resources is one of the critical issues, especially in Aceh. Aceh has abundant of natural gas and oil reserves but most of the revenue from this resource was taken by the Jakarta government, with the local community not being given employment opportunities presented by such natural resources. The uneven division of profits generated by gas and oil caused grievance for the Acehnese in the 1970s and 1980s (Mietzner 2012, 92).

Peace Processes

The first peace process in Aceh was in 1999 under the assistance of the Swiss-based Henry Dunant Centre (HDC). This process produced a 'Humanitarian Pause' in 2002 and 'Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) in 2002 (Aspinall 2005, 15). The CoHA expected a ceasefire, the establishment of peace zone, the disarmament of GAM and relocation of Indonesian security force (Aspinall 2005, 15). Both sides had different views of the CoHA process. The government viewed that any settlement would be in the framework of the unitary state and based on the Special Autonomy law while GAM believed the CoHA process as a means to internationalise the conflict and finally achieve independence. Therefore, both parties lacked trust in each other. Eventually, the process broke down and the government declared the military operation (Aspinall 2005a, 15; Aspinall 2005b, 3). The second negotiation in Aceh emerged after the December 2004 Asian tsunami, a natural disaster which contributed to the Indonesian government and GAM considering negotiations and allowing the international aid in Aceh. The peace talks were facilitated by former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari and the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) (Schulze 2007, 5). The agreement is an outline of a comprehensive settlement and a new political relationship between Aceh and the Indonesia state. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) comprises provisions concerning political participation, human rights, a rule of law, the disarmament of GAM and the reintegration of combatants into society (Aspinall 2005b).

In southern Philippines case, after the five years of confrontation between the Manila government and the MNLF army, pressured by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), two parties signed an agreement in 1976 in Tripoli, Libya, whereby all parties concerned accepted the principle of peaceful negotiation to solve the conflict in Mindanao (Mercado 1984, 163). The Tripoli Agreement was called for special autonomy in thirteen provinces and cities in the southern Philippines, but the areas reduced to only ten provinces (Quimpo 2012, 117). After the failure of the Tripoli Agreement, the Moro rebels went back to the armed group, but there was a split within the group which reduced its political and military strength. Furthermore, President Marcos declared that "the Mindanao conflict is an internal affair and any peace talks with the MNLF should be done in the Philippines on a Filipino basis" (Mercado 1984, 166). Despite the failure, the Tripoli Agreement became the benchmark for future negotiations between the government and the MNLF (Bertrand 2000, 39).

The next attempt was in January 1987, the Aquino Government and the MNLF signed the Jeddah Accord. This accord allowed the expanding of autonomy areas to twenty-three provinces in the southern Philippines (Quimpo 2012, 117-118). A plebiscite was held in the thirteen provinces would constitute the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) but only four decided to be parts of the ARMM. The MNLF consequently refused to recognise the ARMM and boycotted the plebiscite (Quimpo 2012, 118).

Moreover, in September 1996 the Final Peace Agreement on the implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement had been signed between the Government and the MNLF by OIC as a broker in Jakarta, Indonesia (Bertrand 2000, 41). The agreement provided two phases. Firstly, it created the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD). The process of integration MNLF fighters into Philippines armed forces and police. Secondly, a new autonomous would be replaced the ARMM and the SPCD after its approval through a

plebiscite in the fourteen provinces and nine cities (Bertrand 2000, 41-42; Quimpo 2012, 118). However, the signs of collapsing were seen less than a year after the signature. The ARMM and SPCPD were accused of corruption and mismanagement. People in the Cotabato and Lanao have also accused the MNLF of unfair supporting and favour in only a few areas. Thus, the peace agreement lost the supports from locals (Bertrand 2000, 45-48).

The Success in Aceh (Indonesia) and the Failure in Mindanao (Philippines)

The main factors which influenced the success and the failure in both cases are considered into four issues which are the government, the rebel groups, mediator, spoiler, autonomy and other factors.

Firstly, the administration is a critical factor to push the peace happen. The government is a political institution which has the power in legislation and security forces. Walter argues that civil wars tend to recur in countries where the government can neither defeat a rebel movement nor credibly commit to a peace plan (2010, 3). In the peace process, if the government is trustworthy enough to negotiate a peace talk, the war would ultimately end (Walter 2010, 3).

Comparing to the previous administration, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla, came in office in October 2004, genuinely wanted to solve the problem in Aceh. The Yudhoyono Government realised the significance of the link between military and concessions to the rebel movement. Also, Yudhoyono and Kalla had been involved in conflict mediation in their previous roles as senior minister (Mietzner 2012, 98). The concessions granted by Yudhoyono and Kalla were an important sign of seriously settling the peace in Aceh in GAM's view (Mietzner 2012, 99). The trust between the central government and GAM had never been happened before. This was one of the successful implementation of the agreement. Moreover, Kalla was able to convince the majority in the parliament to pass the legislation process to carry out on the Helsinki's agreement to avoid the bad reputation of Indonesia in international community and recurrence of conflict in Aceh (Mietzner 2012, 99).

On the other hand, Stedman states that lack functioning political institutions are more apt to harbour spoilers capable of sabotaging peace agreement (Stedman 2001, cited in Walter 2009, 7). All agreements which signed between the Philippines government and the rebel group failed at the end. Weak political will of the Manila government had been seen as a fragile factor in the peace process in Moro since Ferdinand Marcos administration. The military operation was called to control after signing new agreements from Marcos's regime to Joseph Estrada's government (Mercado 1984, 165-166; Quimpo 2012, 121). Quimpo reveals that the government goes through the motions of conducting negotiations, hoping that in the process the rebel movement can be spilt or some leaders in the rebel group can get lured and corrupted. Sometimes the government signs peace agreement and pretends to implement them, resulting endless peace negotiations (Quimpo 2012, 125-126). The trust between the government and the rebellion never had happened because of the insincere of the government.

Secondly, the rebel movement is another key for successful or failed peace process. GAM was only one insurgency group in Aceh. The cohesion was attributable to the highly ideology character of the movement (Aspinall 2005, 8). GAM participated in all process of negotiation with the Indonesian government, wishing to seek the solutions for the conflict. In the MoU, GAM accepted to demobilise all its troops and to decommission its weapons (Schulze 2007, 4). While there were more than one insurgency movement, MILF formally split off from MNLF in 1984, in the southern Philippines, it made harder to solve the conflict. Moreover, the reports of mismanagement and corruption of the ARMM funds of the Nur Misuari destroyed the trust and legitimacy among the locals (Bertrand 2000, 46). The interests of each rebel groups were different. The government had to settle the negotiations to all groups to entirely end the conflicts.

Next, a mediator plays an important role to assist two sides in the peace talk. Walter argues that third party guarantee can change the level of fear and insecurity as well as the groups will be protected, and promises will be kept (1999). The MoU between GAM and the Indonesian government was achieved by the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) for management of the Aceh conflict. CMI, a non-governmental organisation, has had experienced in conflict management in many regions in the world. CMI was also a neutral with no profits in the region. The qualifications of CMI attracted the Indonesian government and GAM to accept CMI as the mediator. As Stedman argues that when mediation efforts are launched at the proper time, a skillful third party will add the growing sense of the urgency (1996). CMI knew that after the destruction of Tsunami, it was the time when the two sides found that their fighting activities were wasting time and would getting worse. After signing the agreement, CMI still worked with the European Union and ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) for the Aceh Monitoring Mission, hoping to bring stable peace in the region (Schulze 2007). Therefore, I can summarise that CMI has worked in tasks of peace making, peace keeping and peace building.

The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) (formerly Organisation of the Islamic Conference), a governmental organisation with fifty-seven state members in four continents, have been the peace broker between the Manila government and rebel groups in Mindanao. Since OIC is a governmental organisation, the agenda behind the member states was considered as one of a reason of incapable of resolving the conflicts in Mindanao. Furthermore, Quimpo states that the OIC had the capacity to threaten or impose an oil and trade embargo on the Philippines for its ill treatment of Moros in Mindanao (2012, 127). It seemed that OIC played a game with two parties in the conflict instead of using a long term strategies to facilitate to peace process. The agreements went down due to poor communication in interpreting the provision in the peace pacts and OIC could not handle with them.

Additionally, spoiler is a main factor which obstructs the success of the peace settlement. Stedmen argues the definition of spoilers who are leaders and parties who believe the emerging peace threaten their power, world view, and interests and who use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it. (1997) In Aceh, it seemed no spoilers after the Tsunami whereas the spoilers in Mindanao are powerful Christian political leaders in Mindanao. They opposed to the MAO-AD in the congress (Quimpo 2012, 126).

In addition, special autonomy has been mentioned in the agreements in both Aceh and Moro conflict. One of the main aims of special autonomy was to enshrine basic minority rights in law (McGibbon 2004, 2). Gurr argues the most successful autonomy packages tend to be the product of a negotiated settlement between governments and rebel movement. (2000) In case of Aceh, the autonomy was an important part of the formal agreement, showing the advanced political context to make the negotiation success. However, Coakley (1994) cited in Ganguly that autonomy arrangement often fail to resolve ethnic conflicts because they lead to a change of one set of bad masters for another and fail to deliver positive outcomes for people all areas of governance. (2012, 4) The quality of governance was important in this argument. In Mindanao case, the transitional structures of autonomy failed to provide a good test for future autonomous institutions because of mismanagement and corruption. The MNLF leaders failed to show that their control of autonomous institutions could benefit all Muslims and non-Muslims in a new autonomous region (Bertrand 2000, 37).

Finally, natural disaster is another factor which made the peace process succeeded. A Tsunami hit Aceh causing more than a quarter of a million people who counted as dead or missing (McCulloch 2005, 24). This incident brought international aid programmes come to Aceh. The international community put pressure on both sides to resume negotiation. Fighting after the destruction was not good for both sides; Aceh lose its people and property and Indonesia needed assistance to rebuild Aceh. After the devastation, negotiation for peace settlement was the best way which benefited both sides. There is no unexpected incident in Mindanao

Conclusion

In conclusion, conflicts in Aceh and Mindanao are ethnic conflicts which develop to separatist groups. Aceh is a case study of a successful conflict resolution in Southeast Asia that the Indonesia government and the rebel group signed a peace agreement in 2005 to end the war while the violence in Mindanao, southern Philippines is still on-going despite the peace agreements have been signed.

The actions of governments in breaking promises and the military operations lead to the rebel movements. Moreover, injustice, unfair economic policies and human rights abuses increased dissatisfaction and grievances among locals. The Aceh case is well on its way to peace. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Indonesia government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) is its conflict resolution facilitated by the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), an experienced non-governmental organisation. The peace building activities after the MoU has been on well developed. In the Mindanao case, the broken three accords showed the failure of the negotiation process between the Philippines government and the rebel groups, MNLF and MILF. The future of peace in Mindanao depends on the three main actors; the trustworthy and sincere government, transparent rebel leadership and effective and neutral mediators. All have to share the same objective which is peace in the area. The situation in Mindanao was similar to Aceh a decade before the peace agreement; therefore, the peace is possible. The case in Aceh can be a model or case to learn from the conflict management and resolutions and analyse why and how to settle peace in Mindanao.

Bibliography

- Askandar, Kamarulzaman 2007, 'The Aceh conflict: phases of conflict and hopes for peace', in Tan, Andrew (ed.), **A Handbook of terrorism and insurgency in Southeast Asia**. Cheltenham, UK., Northampton, MA., U.S.A.: Edward Elgar.
- Aspinall, Edward 2005a. **Aceh/Indonesia: Conflict Analysis and Options for Systemic Conflict Transformation**. The Berhof Foundation for Peace Support.
- Aspinall, Edward 2005b. **The Helsinki Agreement: A more Promising Basis for Peace in Aceh?** Washington: East West Centre.
- Bertrand, Jacques 2000, 'Peace and conflict in the Southern Philippines: why the 1966 Peace Agreement is Fragile', **Pacific Affairs**, 73, 37-54.
- Christie, Clive J. 1996. **A Modern History of South East Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism**. London, New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers.
- Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), viewed on 7 June 2013 <<http://www.cmi.fi/>>
- Ganguly, Rajat 2012, 'Introduction' in Rajat Ganguly (ed.), **Autonomy and Ethnic Conflict in South and South-East Asia**. Lonson and New York: Routledge.
- Gurr, T. 2000. **Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century**. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace.
- Kreuzer, Peter 2005, 'The Mindanao Conflict: Ripe for Resolution?', **Dialogue and Cooperation**, no.3, 22-23
- McCulloch, Lesley 2005. **Aceh: Then and Now**. UK: Minority Rights Group International (MRG).
- McGibbon, Rodd 2004. Secessionist Challenges in Aceh and Papua: Is Special Autonomy the Solution?, **Policy Studies 10**, Washington : The East-West Center.
- Mercado, Eliseo R. 1984. 'Culture, Economics and Revolt in Mindanao: The origins of the MNLF and the politics of Moro separatism?'.In Lim Joo-Jock and Vani S. (eds.), **Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia**. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Mietzner, Marcus 2012, 'Ending the war in Aceh: Leadership, patronage and autonomy in Yudhoyono's Indonesia', in Rajat Ganguly (ed.), **Autonomy and Ethnic Conflict in South and South-East Asia**. Lonson and New York: Routledge.
- Organization of Islamic Cooperation, viewed 7 June 2013 <<http://www.oic-oci.org/>>
- Quimpo, Nathan Giberty 2012, 'The pitfalls of working for peace in Mindanao', in Rajat Ganguly (ed.), **Autonomy and Ethnic Conflict in South and South-East Asia**. Lonson and New York: Routledge.
- Reid, Anthony, 'Colonial Transformation: a Bitter Legacy'. In **Anthony Reid (ed.), Verandah of Violence**. Singapore: University of Singapore.

- Rodell, Paul A. 2007, 'Separatist insurgency in the southern Philippines', in Tan, Andrew (ed.), **A Handbook of terrorism and insurgency in Southeast Asia**. Cheltenham, UK., Northampton, MA., U.S.A.: Edward Elgar.
- Schulze, Kristen E. 2007. Mission not so impossible: The Aceh Monitoring Mission and Lessons learned for the EU. International Policy Analysis, viewed 20 May 2013, <<http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/04786.pdf>>
- Stedman, Stephen, J 1997, 'Spoiler problems in peace processes'. **International Security**, Vol.22, No.2, 5-53.
- Stedman, Stephen, J 2002, 'Introduction'. In Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Consens (eds.), **Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements**, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reiner.
- Walter, Barbara, F. 2009, 'Bargaining Failures and Civil War'. **Annual Review of Political Science**, 12, 243-261.
- Walter, Barbara F. 2010, 'Conflict Relapse and the Sustainability of Post-Conflict Peace'. **World Development Report Background Paper 2011**.