

วารสาร
ประวัติศาสตร์
ธรรมศาสตร์

THE THAMMASAT
JOURNAL
OF
HISTORY

จีน 2035
China 2035

วิลเลียม เอ. คัลลาแฮน

William A. Callahan

Director, Centre for International Studies,
London School of Economics and Political Science

บทคัดย่อ

หนึ่งในปัญหาสำคัญของต้นศตวรรษที่ 21 คือ การทำนายลักษณะของระเบียบโลกกระทั่งถึงช่วงกลางศตวรรษ บทความขนาดสั้นชิ้นนี้จะพิจารณาการวางแผนของนักอนาคตศาสตร์ชาวจีนสำหรับพรรคคอมมิวนิสต์แห่งสาธารณรัฐประชาธิปไตยประชาชนจีนเพื่อเอาชนะสหรัฐอเมริกาและกลายเป็นประเทศที่สำคัญที่สุดในโลกในปี ค.ศ. 2049 ซึ่งเป็นปีครบรอบ 100 ปีของการสถาปนาพรรคคอมมิวนิสต์แห่งสาธารณรัฐประชาธิปไตยประชาชนจีน โดยบทความนี้เสนอว่าจีนกำลังเปลี่ยนนโยบายจากเชิงรับและมุมมองเกี่ยวกับอนาคตจากภายใน เช่น นโยบาย Harmonious World ของอดีตประธานาธิบดีหู จิน เทา ไปสู่นโยบายที่มีลักษณะเชิงรุกและนโยบายแบบขยายในอนาคตและได้รับสานต่อในนโยบาย China Dream ของประธานาธิบดีสี จิ้น ผิง ซึ่งรวมเอาทัศนคติจีนเป็นศูนย์กลางระดับโลกเข้าไปด้วย อย่างไรก็ตามนโยบายดังกล่าวของปักกิ่งอาจจะไม่ประสบความสำเร็จ ยิ่งกว่านั้นในปี ค.ศ. 2035 อาจจะมีลักษณะบางประการเกิดขึ้นดังนี้ 1.) องค์ประกอบของระเบียบโลกจะมีลักษณะแบบชั่วคราวเดียวหรือไม่ก็เป็นแบบสองชั่วคราวหรือ 2.) ระเบียบโลกเสรีที่ยังคงดำรงอยู่ แม้ว่าจะมีลักษณะที่ผิวเผินมากขึ้นก็ตาม ประเด็นสำคัญคือประชาชนชาวจีนจะมีการตอบสนองอย่างไรเมื่อพรรคคอมมิวนิสต์แห่งสาธารณรัฐประชาธิปไตยประชาชนจีนไม่ประสบความสำเร็จในความเป็นผู้นำโลกซึ่งถูกทำให้เป็นสัญญาณที่ผู้นำจีนไม่อาจหลีกเลี่ยงได้ ความไม่พอใจต่อสิ่งที่ดูเหมือนจะเป็นการไม่ยอมรับต่อ “ความไม่ยุติธรรม” และ “ความไม่ชอบธรรม” ของความทะเยอทะยานของคนจีนอาจจะเป็นสาเหตุของความขัดแย้งขนาดใหญ่ทั้งในระดับภายในประเทศและระหว่างประเทศ

คำสำคัญ: ระเบียบโลก นโยบายต่างประเทศจีน

Abstract

One of the great puzzles of the early twenty-first century is predicting what world order will look like by mid-century. This short essay examines how Chinese futurologists are planning for the PRC to surpass the U.S. to become the most important country in the world by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the PRC. It argues that China is moving from a defensive and inward-looking notion of the future, exemplified by former president Hu Jintao's Harmonious World policy to a more offensive and expansionist view of the future that is informed by Xi Jinping's China Dream policy, which includes a Sinocentric "World Dream." However, it concludes Beijing's plans are unlikely to succeed. Rather it is more likely that 2035 will see either 1) a fragmented world order that is neither unipolar nor bipolar, or 2) a continuation of the existing global liberal order, albeit in a more shallow incarnation. An important issue then is how Chinese people will respond if and when the PRC does not gain the world leadership that has been promised as 'inevitable' by Chinese leaders. The frustration of what is seen as an 'unfair' and 'unjust' denial of Chinese ambitions could cause enormous friction both domestically and internationally.

Keywords: World order, Chinese Foreign policy

1. Intro

One of the great puzzles of the early twenty-first century is predicting what world order will look like by mid-century. Even with China's economic crises in Summer 2015, it is taken for granted that America's unipolar moment has passed, and that we are in the midst of a grand shift of power from the West to the East. The main debate is between offensive realists who argue that as a rising power China is structurally-determined to challenge the current U.S.-led international system, and liberal internationalists who suggest that while global authority may pass from Washington to Beijing, the global liberal order will not only survive this transition, but will be strengthened by it.¹

This theoretical argument has clear policy implications: Should the US continue to engage China to further integrate it into the global liberal order for positive-sum results, or should it treat China as a geopolitical rival in a zero-sum security competition?

¹ See John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, rev. ed. (New York: Norton, 2014); G. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).

What is missing from both realist and liberal institutionalist futures is attention to 1) ideas and identities, and 2) the role of domestic society and politics in foreign policy-making. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a shift from grand ideologies, which universally apply to “humanity,” to ideas and identities that are more local, national and regional. Huntington’s vision of world politics as a “clash of civilizations” is a key example of this trend, and identity politics in East Asia has been an important part of this localizing move.² Yet policy-makers should be wary of Chinese elites who state “China is X”: we should not understand this statement as an objective “fact,” but as one voice in a vigorous debate about ideas and identities. Even so, some voices are louder than others.

Xi Jinping’s “China Dream”

Futures studies are very popular in China, and soon after Xi Jinping took office in late 2012, he joined this conversation by declaring that his “China Dream” is for the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Later, Xi elaborated that to “fulfill the China Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, we must achieve a rich and powerful country, the revitalization of the nation, and

² Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

the people's happiness.”³ Xi outlined a road map to fulfill this China Dream: the “two centuries” project, which in many ways parallels official futurology in the U.S.: the ‘Global Trends 2035’ project of the National Intelligence Council.⁴

The “first century” is the centennial of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2021: the goal is for China to “complete the building of a moderately prosperous society,” which includes doubling the 2010 GDP per capita income by 2020. The party-state has fleshed out this general economic goal by promising a set of “big projects”: 60 percent urbanization rate; the Chinese space station; becoming an “Internet power”; transition to clean energy; and China’s first domestically-built aircraft carrier. Hence by 2020, China promises to be a regional power that has significant hard and soft power capabilities.

³ Xi Jinping in Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., *Xi Jinping guanyu shixian Zhonghua minzu weida fuxing de Zhongguo meng: Lunshu gaobian* [Xi Jinping on realizing the China dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation: Discussion edition], (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, December 2013), p. 3, 5. Other references to Xi’s China dream come from this book.

⁴ *Global Trends 2035*, Washington: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, <http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/organization/national-intelligence-council-global-trends> (accessed September 28, 2015).

The “second century” is the centennial of the founding of the PRC in 2049; its long-term goal is for China to be “a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, civilized and harmonious.” One of the goals is for China not just to be a wealthy country with a world-leading GDP, but to have a wealthy population that has the top per capita GDP. Many public intellectuals have added a set of concrete goals: to surpass the US economically, socially, culturally and politically by 2035.

Scenario 1 examines the continuities between Xi’s China Dream slogan and former president Hu Jintao’s Harmonious World narrative to chart where China will be in 2020:

Scenario 1: Convergence through Multipolarity and Multiple Civilizations

China’s goal, according to Hu Jintao, is to “build a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity.” In this new world order, different civilizations would coexist in the global community, making “humanity more harmonious and our world more colorful.”⁵ Although Hu

⁵ Hu Jintao, “Nuli jianshe tejiu heping, gongtong fanrong de hexie shijie—zai Lianheguo chenglie 60 zhounian shounaohuiyi shang de jianghua” [Making an effort to build a sustainable, peaceful, and united

uses the exotic vocabulary of “civilization,” it is positioned as a “dialogue of civilizations” rather than a “clash of civilizations”: harmonious world policy deliberately avoids challenging the current international system. Here China is not a threat; world harmony is the cornerstone of Beijing’s peaceful development strategy that promises win-win opportunities for everyone in the world.

Harmonious world policy thus is evidence of the “socialization” of China through its growing practice of multilateral diplomacy. As its economy and society became more integrated into the international system, Beijing is learning the rules and norms of international society. Some even argue that China is more of a status quo power than the United States—at least during America’s more unilateral moments.

Harmonious world policy thus is not controversial: It employs mainstream diplomacy to protect China’s national sovereignty by working within the UN system. China here is a responsible power not in the positive sense of seeking to lead the world but in the negative sense of not trying to disorder the world.

prosperous harmonious world—speech at the summit for the 60th anniversary of the United Nations], *Renmin ribao* (September 16, 2005), p. 1.

Yet, not challenging the system does not mean that China accepts US unipolar power. Rather, the talk of multiple civilizations underlines how China prefers a multipolar world order. In this sense, Beijing wants to make the international system work better to build a more orderly and prosperous world.

Convergence here does not apply to values, and questions the global democratization narrative.

While Xi's public statements endorse Hu Jintao's "dialogue of civilizations" narrative, the China Dream also points to an East vs. West "clash of civilizations" mentality. Rather than point to universal ideologies for humanity—like Harmonious World—Xi's futurology looks to China's unique identity: as Xi's speeches show, the China Dream mobilizes the 'Chinese Spirit' and the 'China Strength' to follow the 'Chinese Path'. But as we will see, this is more than the popular nationalism of the 1990s and 2000s: it is part of the evolution of ideas/identity from an inwardly-focused "bide and hide" defensive strategy to an outwardly-focused offensive strategy that involves spreading the China Dream abroad as a global idea, if not as a universalist ideology.

The China Dream now includes an Asia-Pacific Dream and a World Dream that seek to remake the region and the

globe in China's image. Here Asia's future is defined by China's imperial past. Among Chinese public intellectuals there is much discussion of the "Under-Heaven" system (*Tianxia*) as the model for the 21st century: it switches from the UN model of an international system of legally equal nation-states to a hierarchical tributary system that is centered on Beijing. The goal of the China Dream is to restore China to its "natural position" at the center of the world—before it was challenged by the West in the early 1800s. This new interpretation of Confucianism's hierarchical system values order over freedom, ethics over law, and elite governance over democracy and human rights.⁶

Xi Jinping himself started following this script when he spoke of the Asia-Pacific Dream before the APEC meeting in 2014. This dream is not like the "Pacific Century" rhetoric of the 1990s, which followed globalization logic to describe the transnational economic and social exchanges that knit together non-state actors along the Pacific Rim. The Asia-Pacific Dream is more continental and Sinocentric—and as we will see below, more state-centric. The Asia-Pacific Dream will integrate the Eurasian-Pacific region around

⁶ See Zhao Tingyang, "Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept 'All-under-Heaven' (*Tian-xia*)," *Social Identities* 12:1 (2006): 29–41; William A. Callahan, *China Dreams: 20 Visions of the Future* (Oxford University Press, 2015).

Beijing through China's Belt Road Initiative (BRI), the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the Silk Road Fund.

The zero-sum security implications of the China Dream/Asia-Pacific Dream strategy became apparent in Xi's speech at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia in 2014. It criticized Asia's current security architecture, which is grounded in alliances with the U.S., to state that security problems in Asia should "be solved by Asians themselves." This was widely understood to be an "Asia-for-Asians" strategy that excludes the U.S. It complements China's domestic "clash of civilizations" campaigns against "Western values": democracy, civil society, constitutionalism, etc.

Scenario 2: Divergence: From Westernization to Easternization

While the first scenario socializes China into international society, the second reverses this logic to socialize the rest of the globe into the Chinese world order. Here China's rise to global power is not just the story of economic success or military modernization. The PRC's success is normative because Chinese ideas, we are told, are better than Western ideas.

Rather than hope that Chinese civilization will add to global diversity, many public intellectuals see the China Dream in terms of a Sinocentric world unified around Chinese values. The international system of equal nation-states, thus, will be replaced with China's hierarchical Sinocentric tributary system. Chinese thinkers explain that China's exceptional civilization will make the PRC a peaceful and harmonious superpower—but when probed for details, it turns out that even extreme violence can be taken as “peaceful” in China's new world order. China's historical experience shows that in this Sinocentric system, people—and countries—that don't fit in will be coercively “harmonized” and “pacified.”

In this future, the global American Dream is replaced by the global China Dream, Westernization by Easternization, and American exceptionalism by Chinese exceptionalism. In this “clash of civilizations” world, shared interests are possible, but it is difficult to see shared norms or values.

The main difference between the two scenarios is that the first describes a defensive notion of Chinese identity that asserts the PRC's sovereign right to be different in a multicultural world. Scenario 2 is more offensive: it asserts the moral superiority of Chinese civilization and promotes

the China Model as a globally important idea.

Identities or Personalities?

While there is much discussion of ideas/identities in China, there is also a strong tradition of understanding futures in terms of factions and personalities. Chinese think of leadership in terms of “generations,” starting with Mao Zedong as the first generation. The personal experience of the fifth generation has shaped its leaders:

- it is dominated by children of the first generation, who feel that they are the red aristocracy, and thus the natural rulers of China;
- due to elite family background, members of this generation suffered during the Cultural Revolution; this harsh experience nurtured a social Darwinist “you die, I live” view of politics that applies to both the survival of the party-state in China, and to the PRC’s struggles for success in the world.

Xi Jinping embodies these traits. He assumes that he is the smartest person in the room, feels destined to rule China, and thus has centralized power around himself as the “Chairman of Everything.” Xi thus is the strongest ruler since Deng.

Xi is not only a man on a mission, but a man in a hurry to “win” in China’s existential struggles at home and abroad. This centralized personalized leadership style means that Xi is able to make game-changing decisions—for good or ill. He would able to make significant compromises to seal the deal with the U.S. or Japan. But as Mao’s experience shows, strongman leaders who are fueled by a sense of destiny often push their country into an all-or-nothing crisis situation that promises great rewards, at the same time as provoking fundamental risks. For example, China’s anti-corruption campaign at home, and its aggressive policies in the East and South China Seas, both are creating sets of existentially-threatened rivals, who in turn are pushed into high-risk, fast-paced decision-making positions. Xi is confident that he will win the race: he wagers that his actions will vanquish his rivals before they have a chance to counter-attack. Such personal power games have institutional causalities, undermining the collective leadership structures put in place after the Cultural Revolution nearly destroyed the party-state. We will see the results of these gambles by 2020.

While lots of people like to compare Xi with Mao, another way to understand Xi is to compare him with Vladimir Putin, who is much admired in China for his strongman-style of ordering Russia’s chaotic domestic situation, while standing up to the West on the world stage.

Putin is interesting to Beijing because he uses elections and the media to emotionally engage with the masses to legitimize his rule, which is a major concern of the CCP. By 2020, Xi Jinping will be more like Putin: a singular strongman who emotionally connects with the people. There might even be elections: but they would be heavily controlled in a shrinking civil society, as in Russia.

For 2035, we need to think about China's seventh generation leadership, which grew up in the 1980s amidst a rapid expansion of personal, social and economic freedom. The 1989 pro-democracy movement and its violent crackdown are a key memory for this cohort. Thus the seventh generation could make meaningful political reforms. The post-Xi era could witness division at the top, which is another route to fundamental political change in China—albeit a risky one.

Power Diffusion/Concentration

According to some, the transition away from the American unipolar moment is not merely a power shift from West to East, but also a diffusion of power beyond the sovereign state both domestically and globally to multiple actors (multipolarity), multiple institutions (increased multilateralism), and nonstate actors (TNCs, NGOs,

global civil society, terrorist groups). Rather than China replacing the U.S. as the new geopolitical hegemon, this decentered view of power dynamics encourages us to think in terms of complex networks of economic, social, political, cultural and technical power. As Scenario 2 suggests, China Dream enthusiasts do not subscribe to the power diffusion argument. Rather their futures work according to a grand geopolitical calculus that sees world leadership as a “crown,” which Washington is destined to hand over to Beijing by 2035.

More importantly, the China Dream employs a robust view of state power that challenges any notion of power diffusion at home or abroad. The two illiberal ideologies that support the China Dream—socialism and Chinese civilization—both support strong state power. Hence rather than thinking of Chinese identity politics in terms of “nationalism,” it is more useful to think of it in terms of “statism.”⁷ Statism here is not socialist, but “neo-socialist,” where the goal of communist utopia is replaced by the technocratic objective of creating a strong, stable and

⁷ See Xu Jilin. “Zhongguo xuyao liweidan? jin shinian lai Zhongguo guojiazhuyi sichao zhi piban” [Does China need a Leviathan? Critique of the Statist Trend in China], *Gongshiwang* (January 23, 2011); Hu Angang. *China in 2020: A New Kind of Superpower* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011).

modern China that is synonymous with a strong, effective and forward-looking party-state.⁸

While many power diffusion theorists say we are entering a post-sovereign era, China is reasserting sovereignty in many areas: territorial sovereignty, cultural sovereignty, economic sovereignty, and cyber-sovereignty. China is not alone in trying to enforce territorial, cultural and virtual borders. It has been exporting its “Great Firewall” technology, which allows states to enforce virtual sovereignty over the Internet, to authoritarian regimes for years. With Edward Snowden’s leaks about PRISM, many other countries—including democratic ones like Brazil—are not only seeking to assert virtual sovereignty (against the U.S.), but are buying Chinese technology to do it. Contrary to futures that predict that social media will bring down authoritarian states, the result will be greater state control of Chinese ideas/identities domestically, and to a lesser extent greater control of the image of China abroad.

⁸ Frank N. Pieke, *The Good Communist: Elite Training and State Building in Today’s China* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 11.

Challenges/Unknowns

- **Liberal democracy:** while many Western futurologists assume that China will democratize, this essay has taken the opposite stance: China is more likely to continue as an authoritarian state through 2020 and 2035. Yet my argument differs from the party-state that argues that ‘democracy’ is foreign to China, and thus inappropriate at best and destructive at worst. I am not persuaded by either style of determinism: neither is China inevitably democratizing, nor is it inherently authoritarian. As a modern urban capitalist society, democracy could easily grow in China, as it has in other post-Confucian societies: South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, etc. However, because Xi Jinping’s campaigns against ‘universal values’, it is unlikely that meaningful liberal democratic political reform will happen by 2020. It is entirely possible that it could happen by 2035 with a new generation of leadership who grew up in the 1980s, and a society where the majority expects a wide range of personal freedoms, as well as civil society on the Internet. Democracy here is based on robust civil society, and is not just electoralism.

- **How will China’s neighbors react** to a rising China by 2020 and 2035? Although many in Beijing see a Sinocentric region as the natural state of affairs for East Asia, it is unlikely that such post-Confucian societies will accept

a hierarchical view of regional politics. The more Beijing clarifies its Sinocentric views, the more it will generate friction with its neighbors. Indeed, many Asian scholars and officials actually compare China's new Belt Road Initiative to imperial Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.⁹

- This essay assumes that while China's economic growth will slow, it will continue to perform at the rate of the 'new normal' of 6% GDP growth per annum.

What will happen if an economic crisis hits China?

While most international relations specialists in Beijing are optimistic about the inevitability of China's rise, most Chinese economists are deeply concerned about the sustainability of the Chinese economy. Rather than discussing economic issues, though, we should think about how China's leaders would respond to an endogenous crisis. As we saw with Occupy Central in Hong Kong and the Summer 2015 stock market plunge, one way is to blame "hostile foreign forces," which would lead to more extreme expressions of nationalism.

- **To see China as monolithic is highly problematic;** even though China's leaders see ideas/identities

⁹ Shashi Tharoor, "China's Silk Road Revival," *New Perspectives Quarterly* 32(1):18-21; this comparison was made by well-placed scholars in Bangkok, January 7, 2016.

in terms of a singular correct ‘China’, there are deep pockets of opinion among public intellectuals that hold a more nuanced and internationalist view of China’s role in the world. Rather than divide Chinese elites into opposing ideological camps, we should appreciate how many are attracted to both nationalist/statist and global/reformist views of the future. This is why I call China the ‘pessoptimist nation’:¹⁰ the same people can hold quite different views at the same time. Thus understanding politics in terms of an essentialized ‘China’ verses a unitary ‘West’ is problematic. While it is important to recognize the popularity of the China Dream/World Dream formulation, it is also important to note that Chinese elites can also respond positively to multilateral overtures that promote the values of the global liberal order.

- Although unlikely, a **war between the US and China** would be devastating for the region. This is one negative possibility from Xi’s race for supremacy that challenges regional order. India and Brazil would benefit from this conflict.

¹⁰ See William A. Callahan, *China: The Pessoptimist Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2010.

Conclusions

This essay has used Chinese-language sources to stress how Chinese elites see the future in terms of a grand geopolitical and geo-moral struggle between the PRC and the U.S. However, I am not convinced that this is how the world will work in 2035. Rather than being a contest between two superpowers, we are more likely to see either 1) a fragmented world order that is neither unipolar nor bipolar; or 2) the broad global liberal order:

1. The world in 2035 is likely to be fragmented because China is not the only rising power, and countries on its periphery do not want to have to choose between a Sinocentric world and a U.S.-led world. While the China Dream is popular within the PRC, not many elites outside China are buying into its values. Within this fragmented world, there still could be spheres of influence, but they would be unstable due to a thin buy-in to their values.¹¹

2. It is possible that the global liberal order will continue, albeit in a more shallow form. Rather than seeing current trends only in terms of geopolitical struggle, it is

¹¹ See Charles A. Kupchan, *No One's World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

important to use other frameworks. For example, European and Asian allies joining China's AIIB was widely seen as a geopolitical defeat for the U.S.; but if the AIIB follows the norms of transparency and accountability in a rule-based system, then it is a “victory” for the broader global liberal order, regardless of whether Washington leads it or not.

Lastly, we need to think about how Chinese people will respond if and when the PRC does not gain the world leadership that has been promised as “inevitable” by Chinese leaders. The frustration of what is seen as an “unfair” and “unjust” denial of Chinese ambitions could cause enormous friction both domestically and internationally.

References

- Callahan, William A. *China Dreams: 20 Visions of the Future*. Oxford University Press, 2015.
- . *China: The Pessimist Nation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.
- Hu Angang. *China in 2020: A New Kind of Superpower*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011.
- Hu Jintao, “Nuli jianshe tejiu heping, gongtong fanrong de hexie shijie—zai Lianheguo chenglie 60 zhounian shounaohuiyi shang de jianghua” [Making an effort to build a sustainable, peaceful, and united prosperous harmonious world—speech at the summit for the 60th anniversary of the United Nations]. *Renmin ribao*. September 16, 2005.
- Ikenberry, G. John. *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.
- Kupchan, Charles A. *No One's World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Mearsheimer, John J. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. rev. ed. New York: Norton, 2014.

Piecke, Frank N. *The Good Communist: Elite Training and State Building in Today's China*. Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Shashi Tharoor. "China's Silk Road Revival." *New Perspectives Quarterly* 32(1):18-21. (This comparison was made by well-placed scholars in Bangkok, January 7, 2016.)

Washington: Office of the Director of National Intelligence. "Global Trends 2035." <http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/organization/national-intelligence-council-global-trends> (accessed September 28, 2015).

Xi Jinping in Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi. ed. *Xi Jinping guanyu shixian Zhonghua minzu weida fuxing de Zhongguo meng: Lunshu gaobian* [Xi Jinping on realizing the China dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation: Discussion edition]. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, December 2013.

Xu Jilin. "Zhongguo xuyao liweidan? jin shinian lai Zhongguo guojiazhuyi sichao zhi pipan" [Does China need a Leviathan? Critique of the Statist Trend in China]. *Gongshiwang*. January 23, 2011.

Zhao Tingyang. "Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept 'All-under-Heaven' (Tian-xia)." *Social Identities* 12:1 (2006): 29–41.

