Prediction Market Policies
คำสำคัญ:
Prediction Market, Automated Market Maker, Policy, Bank Runบทคัดย่อ
Prediction markets are a mechanism for collating participants’ beliefs into a probability that a future outcome will take place. Their historical purpose was to provide governments, management, and other leadership with accurate forecasts, in order to inform future decision-making. Participants of prediction markets are financially rewarded for accurate predictions, incentivizing the communication of well-researched, unbiased views. Using qualitative research methods and meta-synthesis of prediction market implementations, this study examines practical approaches to prediction markets, using them to inform future practices. The provision of market liquidity by Automated Market Makers (AMM) is described, and examples of AMMs are detailed.
This article provides a policy framework for prediction markets, with a view to preventing negative side effects that may arise from their practice. Areas of potential concern are examined, with the example of a bank run as a case study, and restrictions on prediction market structure and on permissible contracts are devised as necessary to avoid adverse outcomes.
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