Reputation in an Environment with Adaptive Customers

Authors

  • Tanapong Potipiti Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand

Keywords:

Reputation, Repeated Games, Adaptive Agents

Abstract

This paper studies the evolution of firms' reputation by in an infinite repeated game in which firms are rational but customers are adaptive. Customer behavior is not rational but adaptive and governed by the replicator dynamic equation. In this game, firms choose effort levels in order to produce quality goods. The customers' strategy is to choose the firm they would buy the good from. Different from existing studies, numerical results from numerical dynamic programming show that the equilibrium is unique and can replicate several real market characteristics.

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Published

2009-12-01

How to Cite

Potipiti, T. (2009). Reputation in an Environment with Adaptive Customers. SOUTHEAST ASIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 147–159. Retrieved from https://so05.tci-thaijo.org/index.php/saje/article/view/100206

Issue

Chulalongkorn Journal of Economics, Vol. 21 No. 3 (September - December 2009)

Section

Original Articles

License

The submission of a manuscript implies that the paper is an original work and has not been published elsewhere. The author(s) authorize the journal to reproduce or distribute the paper in printed or other electronic forms.