โรงเรียนกวดวิชาและครูสอนพิเศษในแบบจำลองตัวการตัวแทน
บทคัดย่อ
บทความนี้นำแบบจำลองตัวการตัวแทน (The principal-agent model) ของ Holmstrom & Milgrom (1987,1991) มาดัดแปลงและเพิ่มเติมเพื่อใช้อธิบายปฏิกิริยาระหว่างโรงเรียนกวดวิชากับครูสอนพิเศษ แบบจำลองที่ปรับปรุงแล้วทำนายว่า ระดับการสร้างแรงจูงใจให้กับครูและระดับการเตรียมตัวของครู ได้รับผลกระทบเชิงบวกจาก (1) คุณภาพของการเรียนการสอนกวดวิชา (2) ช่องว่างของรายได้ระหว่างผู้ที่เรียนจบจากมหาวิทยาลัยชั้นนำกับมหาวิทยาลัยอื่นๆ และ (3) การลดลงของอัตราส่วนลดมูลค่าในอนาคตของครัวเรือน
References
1.Biswal, B.P. (1999) Private tutoring and public corruption: A cost-effective education system for
developing countries, The Developing Economies, 37(2), 222-240.
2.Dang, H-A & Rogers, F.H. (2008) How to interpret the growing phenomenon of private tutoring:
human capital deepening, inequality increasing, or waste of resources? Paper provided by the World Bank in its series Policy Research Working paper Series with number 4530.
3.Dessy, S.E., St-Amour, P. & Vencatachellum, D. (1998) The economics of private tutoring.
Paper provided by Université Laval, Département de économique in its series Cahiers de Recherche with number 9809.
4.Foss, J. N. & Laursen, K. (2002) Performance pay, delegation, and multitasking under
uncertainty and innovativeness: an empirical investigation. DRUID working paper no. 02-14.
5.Glewwe, P. & Jayachandran, S. (2006) Incentive to teach badly? After-school tutoring in
developing countries, Mimeo, University of Minnesota.
6.Haubrich, J. G. (1991) Risk aversion, performance pay, and the principal-agent problem.
Working paper no. 9118, the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
7.Holmstrom, B. & Milgrom P. (1987) Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of
Intertemporal Incentives, Econometrica, 55(2), pp. 303–328.
8.Holmstrom, B. & Milgrom P. (1991) Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: Linear Contracts,
Asset Ownership and Job Design, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 7, pp. 24-52.
9.Kim, J.H. (2007). A game theoretical approach to private tutoring, NCSPE Research
Publications, 144.
10.Kim, S. & Lee, J-H (2002). Private tutoring and demand for education in South Korea, KDI
School Working Paper.
11.Ng, T. & Li, M. (2012). How does private tutoring corrupt a teachers' performance pay system,
Hong Kong, The Chinese University of Hong Kong.
12.Scott, S. (1998). The dependence of pay-performance sensitivity on the size of the firm, The
Review of Economics and Statistics, 80 (3), pp. 436–443.
13.Srinivasan, R. J. & Lal, R. (1993) Compensation plans for single- and multi-product salesforces:
An application of the Holmstrom-Milgrom model, Management Science, 39 (7), pp. 777-793.
developing countries, The Developing Economies, 37(2), 222-240.
2.Dang, H-A & Rogers, F.H. (2008) How to interpret the growing phenomenon of private tutoring:
human capital deepening, inequality increasing, or waste of resources? Paper provided by the World Bank in its series Policy Research Working paper Series with number 4530.
3.Dessy, S.E., St-Amour, P. & Vencatachellum, D. (1998) The economics of private tutoring.
Paper provided by Université Laval, Département de économique in its series Cahiers de Recherche with number 9809.
4.Foss, J. N. & Laursen, K. (2002) Performance pay, delegation, and multitasking under
uncertainty and innovativeness: an empirical investigation. DRUID working paper no. 02-14.
5.Glewwe, P. & Jayachandran, S. (2006) Incentive to teach badly? After-school tutoring in
developing countries, Mimeo, University of Minnesota.
6.Haubrich, J. G. (1991) Risk aversion, performance pay, and the principal-agent problem.
Working paper no. 9118, the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
7.Holmstrom, B. & Milgrom P. (1987) Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of
Intertemporal Incentives, Econometrica, 55(2), pp. 303–328.
8.Holmstrom, B. & Milgrom P. (1991) Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: Linear Contracts,
Asset Ownership and Job Design, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 7, pp. 24-52.
9.Kim, J.H. (2007). A game theoretical approach to private tutoring, NCSPE Research
Publications, 144.
10.Kim, S. & Lee, J-H (2002). Private tutoring and demand for education in South Korea, KDI
School Working Paper.
11.Ng, T. & Li, M. (2012). How does private tutoring corrupt a teachers' performance pay system,
Hong Kong, The Chinese University of Hong Kong.
12.Scott, S. (1998). The dependence of pay-performance sensitivity on the size of the firm, The
Review of Economics and Statistics, 80 (3), pp. 436–443.
13.Srinivasan, R. J. & Lal, R. (1993) Compensation plans for single- and multi-product salesforces:
An application of the Holmstrom-Milgrom model, Management Science, 39 (7), pp. 777-793.
เผยแพร่แล้ว
2012-03-22
How to Cite
ปิ่นมณี ป. (2012). โรงเรียนกวดวิชาและครูสอนพิเศษในแบบจำลองตัวการตัวแทน. Thailand and The World Economy, 30(2), 49–69. สืบค้น จาก https://so05.tci-thaijo.org/index.php/TER/article/view/136693
