The Independence of the Public Sector Anti-Corruption Commission

Authors

  • ติญทรรศน์ ประทีปพรณรงค์ สถาบันบัณฑิตพัฒนบริหารศาสตร์

Keywords:

corruption, anti-corruption, PACC, good governance, independence

Abstract

The objectives of this research were: 1) to analyze de facto independence of the anticorruption and malfeasance mechanism under the regulatory oversight of the Public Sector Anti-Corruption Commission (PACC); and 2) to propose the way in which de facto independence of such mechanism could be enhanced. This research adopted a qualitative approach and used in-depth interviews for data collection. As the examination of the anti-corruption and malfeasance mechanism requires penetrating insights from the stakeholders having direct experience of the mechanism, a purposive sampling technique was therefore adopted to recruit samples (participants) of this research; as a result, 41 participants were recruited, these include PACC personnel, complainants, members of the National Legislative Assembly, National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) personnel, police officers, representatives from the private sector, representatives from civil society and academics. The empirical findings of this research indicated that: 1) most research participants took the view that the Office of the PACC should become independent structurally in order to ensure de facto independence of its anti-corruption and malfeasance mechanism; and 2) this research proposes amendments to the Executive Measures in Anti-Corruption Act with the aim of introducing structural reforms to the PACC in order that the Office of the PACC could be free from government control.

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Laws cited

Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, B.E.2560 [in Thai]

Organic Act on Prevention and Suppression of Corruption, B.E.2561 [in Thai]

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Published

2019-06-28

How to Cite

ประทีปพรณรงค์ ต. (2019). The Independence of the Public Sector Anti-Corruption Commission. Sukhothai Thammathirat Open University Journal, 32(1), 28–42. retrieved from https://so05.tci-thaijo.org/index.php/stouj/article/view/206837

Issue

Section

Research Articles