COMPARATIVE STUDY OF EXPRESSWAY MANAGEMENT MODEL, A CASE STUDY BY EXAT CONDUCTION THEIR OWN (BANG PHLI - SUKSAWAT LINE) AND PRIVATIZATION INVEST IN THE OPERATION OF (SI RAT –OUTER RING ROAD EXPRESSWAY)

Abstract

The Expressway Authority of Thailand (EXAT), a state enterprise under the Ministry of Transport, operates Thailand's system of high-capacity controlled-access highways serving the Bangkok Metropolitan Area (BMA) and some nearby provinces. Qualitative research was used to study the EXAT

management model from the point of view of investors and management. Its

model for private investment partners in terms of cooperating to provide services was examined, and

differences compared between EXAT management model and private joint venture operator model.

EXAT management, staff, and government officers from the State Enterprise Policy Office (SEPO). Data was gathered from in-depth interviews and a literature review.

That when EXAT management controlled the Bang Phli - Suksawat Expressway, its pre-implementation process was identical to when it

allowed a private company to invest in operating the Si Rat - Outer Ring Road Expressway.

             For the result, before considering each project, a study of propriety and possibility occurs to evaluate each project as suitable for EXAT management or a private investor. In the case of the Bang Phli-Suksawat Expressway, what was originally a Department of Highways project was deemed by the government as a project for EXAT, to be completed before Suvarnabhumi Airport opened, to connect routes and improve traffic flow. Due to the limited time, EXAT was unable to obtain private investment, and was obliged to proceed independently. Had

EXAT located a private investor by the deadline, the government would have avoided public debt. For Bang Phli-Suksawat Expressway, EXAT worked with private industries, while the
Si Rat - Outer Ring Road Expressway involved a 30-year concession contract, complicating service procedures. Delays were caused by staff and official government protocol. Contractually,

the agreement could have been more economical. Contract disadvantages with

private companies result in concessions that affect the post-implementation process, such as conditions under which private companies avoid responsibility for damages that might occur. As a governmental entity, EXAT becomes responsible by default for such damages, in addition to those already specified in the contracts. These findings should be useful for determining the most effective new EXAT contractual procedures for agreements with private enterprises.