อิทธิพลของกลไกของการกำกับดูแลกิจการที่มีต่อความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างขนาดธุรกิจกับระดับของการเปิดเผยข้อมูลภาคสมัครใจของบริษัทจดทะเบียนในประเทศไทย

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จักรวุฒิ ชอบพิเชียร

บทคัดย่อ

บทคัดย่อ

การศึกษาก่อนหน้านี้มีความพยายามอย่างมากเพื่อกำหนดลักษณะของความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างขนาดของธุรกิจกับระดับของการเปิดเผยข้อมูลภาคสมัครใจโดยคาดว่าจะมีความสัมพันธ์ทางอ้อมมากกว่าทางตรง ดังนั้นบทความนี้ได้ศึกษาค้นคว้าโดยใช้การเพิ่มเติมเทคนิคเพื่อสร้างรูปแบบของสมมุติฐานจากการใช้ตัวแปรแทรกซ้อน คือ ดัชนีชี้วัดคุณภาพของคณะกรรมการบริษัทและตัวแปรกดดัน คือ ประธานกรรมการบริหารที่มีความเข้มข้นความเป็นเจ้าของในระดับสูงซึ่งเป็นกลไกของการกำกับดูแลกิจการ ผลการวิจัยแนะนำว่าขนาดของธุรกิจที่ใหญ่กว่า มีค่าดัชนีชี้วัดคุณภาพของคณะกรรมการบริษัทสูงกว่าและมีผลทำให้มีระดับของการเปิดเผยข้อมูลภาคสมัครใจสูงกว่า และเมื่อเพิ่มตัวแปรแทรกซ้อนจากดัชนีชี้วัดคุณภาพของคณะกรรมการบริษัทซึ่งถูกควบคุมโดยการกระทำของประธานกรรมการบริหารที่มีความเข้มข้นความเป็นเจ้าของในระดับสูงจะส่งผลกระทบไปทำให้ตัวแปรแทรกซ้อนมีผลกระทบน้อยลง  นอกจากนี้เมื่อขนาดของคณะกรรมการบริษัทเป็นตัวแปรควบคุมพบว่ามีอิทธิพลเชิงบวกต่อดัชนีชี้วัดคุณภาพของคณะกรรมการบริษัทและระดับของการเปิดเผยข้อมูลภาคสมัครใจ

คำสำคัญ : กลไกของการกำกับดูแลกิจการ, ขนาดของธุรกิจ, ความเป็นเจ้าของกิจการของผู้บริหาร, การเปิดเผยข้อมูลภาคสมัครใจ, บริษัทจดทะเบียนในประเทศไทย

 

Abstract

Despite intensive efforts to determine the nature of the relationship between the firm-specific characteristic as firm size and the level of voluntary disclosure (VDI), this issue is expected that the relationship is in fact more of an indirect than direct nature. Thus, this paper attempts to delve deeper into this complex phenomenon by employing a resource dependency perspective to hypothesize a model of mediation as board of directors’ quality index (BOQI) is moderated by a high concentration of CEO’s ownership (HCEO) as corporate governance mechanisms. The findings suggest that the larger firm size, the higher is the BOQI and this in turn will lead to the higher VDI. These relationships appear to be weaker when there is moderation as HCEO, produced by the mediation process of the BOQI, and when this process is controlled, the residual moderation of the treatment effect is reduced. Further, board size as control variable is found to have a positive significant influence on BOQI and VDI.

Keywords : Corporate Governance Mechanisms, Firm Size, Managerial Ownership, Voluntary Disclosure, Listed Companies in Thailand

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