ANTI-CORRUPTION, AGENCY COST, AND EARNINGS QUALITY IN THAI SETTINGS
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บทคัดย่อ
The participation in anti-corruption activities is a voluntary program for a firm. The study presented here therefore addresses the connection between anti-corruption activity participation and agency problems of Thai listed firms during 2011-2016. We employed different proxies for agency problems in our investigation. We find that the firms participating in anti-corruption activities are more likely to have low agency cost and good corporate governance mechanism. In addition, earnings information is of higher quality for the firms participating in anti-corruption activities. The evidence suggests that the participation in anti-corruption activities should encourage the business sustainability as promoted by Thai regulators.
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“ข้าพเจ้าและผู้เขียนร่วม (ถ้ามี) ขอรับรองว่า บทความที่เสนอมานี้ยังไม่เคยได้รับการตีพิมพ์และไม่ได้อยู่ระหว่างกระบวนการพิจารณาลงตีพิมพ์ในวารสารหรือแหล่งเผยแพร่อื่นใด ข้าพเจ้าและผู้เขียนร่วมยอมรับหลักเกณฑ์การพิจารณาต้นฉบับ ทั้งยินยอมให้กองบรรณาธิการมีสิทธิ์พิจารณาและตรวจแก้ต้นฉบับได้ตามที่เห็นสมควร พร้อมนี้ขอมอบลิขสิทธิ์บทความที่ได้รับการตีพิมพ์ให้แก่สถาบันการจัดการปัญญาภิวัฒน์หากมีการฟ้องร้องเรื่องการละเมิดลิขสิทธิ์เกี่ยวกับภาพ กราฟ ข้อความส่วนใดส่วนหนึ่งและ/หรือข้อคิดเห็นที่ปรากฏในบทความข้าพเจ้าและผู้เขียนร่วมยินยอมรับผิดชอบแต่เพียงฝ่ายเดียว”
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