Anti – corruption and multi-level of social collaboration

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สุนทร คุณชัยมัง


Anti-corruption task is characterized both as a special task for a specific case and a task that needs to collaborate closely with other social sectors.This article pays attention to finding the factors that lead to the success of multiple tasks simultaneously either under UN Global Impact or the Three Pronged Strategy of the anti-corruption organization initiated by the Independent Commission Against Corruption of Hong Kong.The results found that the success of anti- corruption agency both in the developed and the developing countries operate according to the Three Pronged Strategy which consists of law enforcement, prevention, and promoting public consciousness. The success was the results of the collaboration at the policy and the operation level, arranging the relationship between principle and practice, arranging the effective management both within the organization and with others organization, including creating learning amid the social reality.


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