Enduring Autocracy: Democratic Institutions as Powerful Instruments of Competitive Authoritarianism in Thailand

Abstract

How do democratic institutions affect competitive authoritarian regimes? Literature on autocratic consolidation explains that reformed or designed political institutions under competitive authoritarianism that promote political participation and representation negatively affect the transition to democracy. Not only do scores of autocrats still survive, but they are also even stronger and have more allies buttressing the regime. Nevertheless, the mechanisms and strategies which authoritarian governments employ to manipulate democratic institutions in a sophisticated manner have not been systematically expounded. Relying on the above-mentioned theoretical expectation, this article argues that the period of authoritarian election is a critical moment when the political arena provides opportunities for various political actors to show up clearly, and that this enables the autocratic governments to co-opt some actors through policy concessions and redistribution of political rewards, resulting in the eventual consolidation of their power after the election. To evaluate the argument, this article selects Thailand’s 2019 general election as a case study, where the interactions of political actors before and after the election are examined. The findings help underline the explanations derived from the literature on autocratic consolidation.