CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS, POLITICAL CONNECTION AND EARNINGS QUALITY

Authors

  • Kanjana Prakobsaeng
  • Pattanant Petchchhedchoo

Keywords:

Corporate Governance Mechanisms, Political Connection, Earnings Quality

Abstract

This research aims to investigate the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms, political connection and earnings quality. The discretionary accruals were used as a variable to measure earnings quality. The corporate governance mechanisms can be measured from characteristics of the board of directors, the management, and the audit committee. The population in this study was Thai listed companies in SET100 and SET50. A tool for collecting data was a worksheet and the format was developed from a review of the literature. Multiple regression analysis is the main statistical technique to analyze data.

The result of this research showed that number of audit committee meetings and organization’s debtors have negative relationship with discretionary accruals. In addition, political connection of the board of directors has a positive relationship with discretionary accruals.

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Published

2020-06-18

How to Cite

Prakobsaeng, K. ., & Petchchhedchoo, P. . (2020). CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS, POLITICAL CONNECTION AND EARNINGS QUALITY. SUTHIPARITHAT JOURNAL, 31(99), 1–15. retrieved from https://so05.tci-thaijo.org/index.php/DPUSuthiparithatJournal/article/view/243531

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Section

Research Articles